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Background (Fixed-Cost) Avoidance-Choices,
Foreground (Variable-Cost) Avoidance-
Choices, and the Economically Efficient
Approach for Courts to Take in Marine-
Salvage Cases: A Positive Analysis and
Related Critique of Landes and Posner's
Classic Study
RICHARD S. MARKOVITSt
This Article (1) analyzes the second-best' and third-
best2 economic (allocative3) efficiency of the approach the
courts are reported to use to determine the payment they
require marine rescuees to make to marine salvors who
rescued them in situations in which the salvors could not
negotiate binding prices for their services and (2) evaluates
the argument that Landes and Posner used in their classic
article to establish the allocative efficiency of the courts'
t John B. Connally Chair in Law, The University of Texas School of Law; B.A.,
Cornell University (1963); Ph.D., London School of Economics (1966); L.L.B.,
Yale University (1968); M.A., Oxford University (1981). I would like to thank my
Texas Law School colleagues Jack Getman, Michael Sturley, and David
Robertson for supplying me with useful information about marine-salvage law
and practice.
1. The second-best allocatively efficient approach to any issue takes
complete account of all Pareto imperfections present in the system that affect
the allocative efficiency of the events or policy-options whose allocative
efficiency is being analyzed.
2. Third-best-allocative-efficiency analysis takes account of the inevitable
cost and inaccuracy of data and the inevitable cost and probable imperfectness
of theoretical analysis when deciding what data to collect and what theoretical
possibilities to consider. Third-best-allocative-efficiency analysis is the approach
that is ex ante allocatively efficient, given the cost and imperfectness of data
and analysis.
3. I substitute "allocative" for "economic" to remind readers that the concept
of allocative efficiency is a technical economic concept and that choices that are
allocatively efficient may be inconsistent with our rights-commitments and/or
undesirable, rights-considerations aside. See Richard S. Markovits, On the
Relevance of Economic Efficiency Conclusions, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 26-28
(2001).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
(reported) approach to such marine-salvage cases.4 I want to
emphasize at the outset, however, that although the Article
does take Second-Best Theory into account, Second Best
plays a far less important role in the analysis that follows
than the reality that marine-salvage law affects the
distortion in the profitability not only of relevant variable-
cost (foreground) avoidance-decisions at the time of
imperilment but also of relevant pre-imperilment fixed-cost
(background) avoidance-decisions (which affect possible
rescuers' ability to effectuate a rescue and possible rescuees'
"need for rescue").
Marine-salvage law affects the distortion in the
incentives of potential marine salvors to make not only
foreground decisions on such matters as whether to attempt
a rescue or the nature of the rescue attempt to make (given
the attributes and locations of their salvage ships and the
quantity, attributes, and training of each of their salvage
ships' personnel) but also background decisions on such
matters as whether to build a salvage ship, the attributes of
any salvage ship they construct, the quantity, attributes,
and training of each of their salvage-ship's officers and
crews, and the physical disposition of any salvage ships they
own. Similarly, marine-salvage law affects the distortion in
the incentives of potential marine rescuees to make not only
foreground decisions on such matters as whether to accept
offers of assistance, whether to make efforts to rescue
themselves, and what type of self-rescue attempt to make
(given the ship they are operating, the location of that ship,
the weather, the quantity and nature of the cargo they are
carrying, the manner in which that cargo has been stowed,
and the quantity, attributes, and training of their ship's
personnel), but also background decisions about whether to
operate a ship at all, whether to operate a cargo or
passenger ship, the physical attributes of the ship they
operate, the attributes of the cargo and/or passengers they
carry, the quantity, attributes, and training of their officers
and crew, how many trips to make each year with any ship
they operate, the route to take on any voyage, the time of
year (weather conditions) at which (under which) they make
any trip. As we shall see, this complexity of the relevant
4. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good
Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) [hereinafter Landes & Posner].
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reality is important because (1) the particular formula for
determining marine-salvage awards that will do best at
inducing one party to make allocatively efficient foreground
or background decisions will not do best at inducing that
party to make allocatively efficient decisions of the other
type and (2) the formula that will do the best job that any
such formula could do of minimizing the amount of marine-
peril-related economic inefficiency that one party's choices
will generate will not do the best job that any such formula
could do at minimizing the amount of marine-peril-related
misallocation that the other party will generate.
The Article has seven sections. The first delineates two
equivalent operationalizations of the most-allocatively-
efficient response a State could make to marine losses and
marine-peril contingencies.5 One of the operationalizations
focuses on the various types of allocative costs that marine-
peril contingencies can generate, and the other focuses on
the various types of marine-peril-related misallocation that
can be generated. In addition to distinguishing these two
operationalizations, Section One delineates a
comprehensive list of the various specific types of possible
marine-peril-related costs that can be generated. Section
Two lists various types of policies that could be components
of the most-allocatively-efficient response a State could
make to such realities and possibilities. This list includes,
but is not restricted to, decisions to require marine rescuees
to compensate their rescuers-the kinds of decisions that
admiralty courts make in marine-salvage cases. Section
Three describes the second-best- allocatively-efficient
approach for a judicial system to take in suits in which
successful salvors who have not been able to negotiate
binding prices for their salvage services seek to obtain
compensation from the owners of the salvage they rescued
(and/or from other potential marine-peril victims whose
losses they prevented). Section Four speculates on the third-
best-allocatively-efficient approach for a judicial system to
5. Admittedly, marine-salvage law is not concerned exclusively with marine
perils in the sense of perils that arise at sea. Thus, the fact that goods flooded
into the sea from the land and perhaps airplanes that crashed into the sea are
salvageable show that marine-salvage law may apply when a rescued object did
not become imperiled at sea. However, for expositional reasons, the text will
continue to use locutions that imply that marine-salvage law and policy are
concerned with marine-peril issues-indeed, are concerned with situations that
involve the imperilment of a ship on navigable waters.
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take to such "marine-salvage" suits. Section Five explains
why a law granting such marine salvors a right to obtain
compensation through a private lawsuit that would be
handled in such a third-best-allocatively-efficient way (A)
would almost certainly not minimize the amount of
misallocation generated by the marine-peril-related
decisions of potential marine rescuers and potential marine
rescuees;6 (B) would be unlikely to constitute the third-best-
allocatively-efficient response a State could make to marine-
peril contingencies; and (C) might be a component of such a
third-best-allocatively-efficient response to marine-peril
contingencies. Section Six then analyzes the various
respects in which the courts' reported approach to such
marine-salvage cases is not second-best or third-best
allocatively efficient. Finally, Section Seven uses Section
Six's conclusion to criticize Landes and Posner's claim that
the common law of marine salvage "is consistent with"7 and
displays "impressive congruence" with their hypothesis that
"the rules of judge-made law are best explained as efforts-
however unwitting-to bring about [economically-] efficient
results,"' and points out the deficiencies of the type of
argument Landes and Posner use to support their claim
that judicially-announced marine-salvage law is allocatively
efficient. The importance of this argument-type critique is
enhanced by the fact that Landes and Posner and others
use the type of argument Landes and Posner employ to
establish the economic efficiency of judge-announced
marine-salvage law to establish the economic efficiency of
"judge-made" law in general.9
The Article's analysis is important for at least five
reasons. First, marine-salvage law is important in itself-it
affects decisions that seem likely to have a considerable
impact on allocative efficiency and that do have a
considerable distributive impact. ° Second, the full analysis
6. Potential rescuers in salvage situations occupy the position of potential
injurers in conventional accident situations, and potential rescuees in salvage
situations occupy the position of potential victims in conventional situations.
7. Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 102.
8. Id. at 128.
9. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23 (4th ed. 1992).
10. See, for example, Wayne T. Brough, Liability Salvage-by Private
Ordering, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 109 n.40, for Brough's account of the dollar
[Vol. 59
2011] CRITIQUE OF LANDES & POSNER
of the allocative efficiency of marine-salvage law applies
equally well not only to finders and Good Samaritan law (as
Landes and Posner recognize)11 but also to tort law and
environmental law (in multiple-care cases, in which
allocative efficiency will be maximized only if both the
potential injurer and the potential victim engage in
appropriate avoidance). Third, half of the analysis of the
allocative efficiency of marine-salvage law (the part that
focuses on the potential rescuer) applies to individual-care2
tort and environmental situations and to intellectual-
property problems (in which the potential discoverer or
information-disseminator occupies the position of the
potential rescuer or potential injurer). Fourth, the Article's
analysis of the allocative efficiency of marine-salvage law
takes account of general-equilibrium feedback-loops and
The General Theory of Second Best 3-two considerations
amounts involved in the salvage cases heard by the American Institute of
Marine Underwriters.
11. Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 84, 119-27.
12. In my terminology, "individual-care" situations are situations in which
the most-allocatively-efficient response to an accident-or-pollution-loss
contingency is for either the potential victim or the potential injurer to avoid.
Such situations are contrasted with "no-care" and "multiple-care" situations, in
which the most-allocatively-efficient response to such a contingency is
respectively for no one to avoid and for both the potential victim and the
potential injurer to engage in some avoidance. I substitute the expression
"multiple-care" for its standard counterpart "joint-care" to avoid giving the
impression that, in multiple-care situations, the potential victim and potential
injurer must arrange the coordination of their avoidance-moves-for example,
by discussing their responses. I should point out that, in my usage, joint-care
situations are not synonymous with situations in which "joint torts" may occur-
that is, with situations in which any resulting loss will have been caused by the
choices of multiple potential injurers (by more than one "joint tortfeasor").
13. General-equilibrium analysis takes account of the interrelationship
between various decisions-for example, a general-equilibrium analysis of the
impact of some choice on outcomes in one "sector" of the economy will take
account of the way in which the choice in question will influence outcomes in
that sector indirectly by influencing choices made in other sectors of the
economy. The General Theory of Second Best asserts the following proposition:
Given a series of conditions whose fulfillment guarantees the attainment of an
optimum, if one or more of these conditions cannot be or will not be fulfilled,
there is no general reason to believe that fulfilling or more closely
approximating more of the remaining conditions will bring one closer to the
optimum than fulfilling or more closely approximating fewer of the remaining
conditions. The intuitive justification for this proposition focuses on the fact that
the "imperfections" one can remove will in general be as likely to counteract as
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that are virtually always critical and that virtually all Law
& Economics scholarship ignores. And fifth, this Article is
important (1) because its conclusion that judge-announced 4
marine-salvage law is not as allocatively efficient as it could
be runs counter not only to Landes and Posner's conclusion
but also to a more general (and equally-wrong) "Chicago"
claim that all judge-announced law is in some (ill-specified)
sense "best explained as a system for maximizing the
wealth of society" (in essence, for maximizing economic
efficiency) 5 and (2) because its argument reveals the
deficiencies in the type of argument that Landes, Posner,
and others use to support their "economic efficiency of
judge-made law" claim.
I. THE NOTION OF THE MOST-ALLOCATIVELY-EFFICIENT
RESPONSE FOR THE STATE TO MAKE TO MARINE-PERIL
CONTINGENCIES-Two EQUIVALENT OPERATIONALIZATIONS
Analyses of the allocative efficiency of any State
response to marine-peril contingencies could focus either on
the impact of that response on the total amount of allocative
costs the relevant contingencies would generate if the policy
or policies in question were adopted or on the total amount
to compound the "imperfections" one cannot or will not eliminate. Virtually all
Law & Economics economic-efficiency analyses ignore The General Theory of
Second Best by proceeding on the assumption that any policy that reduces the
number or extent of Pareto imperfections in the economy (that reduces the
extent to which the conditions for maximum allocative efficiency are not
fulfilled) will on that account increase allocative efficiency. For the first formal
statement of The General Theory of Second Best, see R.K. Lancaster & R.G.
Lipsey, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11-13
(1956). For a more general discussion of the significance of Second-Best Theory
for legal scholarship, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, TRUTH OR ECONOMICS: ON THE
DEFINITION, PREDICTION, AND RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (2008);
Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An
Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1998).
14. I use the expression "judge-announcedf' law to avoid the following issue:
Do judges find the law or make new law in cases in which the internally-right
answer to the legal-rights issue posed is contestable? My own clearly-
contestable position is that judges find the law in all such cases. For an
explanation, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE (1998). Virtually
all Law & Economics scholars believe that judges make the law in such cases.
See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 128.
15. POSNER, supra note 9, at 23.
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of marine-peril-related misallocation the policies would
cause or fail to eliminate (if one adopts the standard,
implicit economic convention of counting allocative
transaction costs as a type of misallocation). 6
Correspondingly, the State response to marine-peril-related
contingencies that was most allocatively efficient could be
said to be most allocatively efficient either because it
minimized total marine-peril-generated allocative costs or,
equivalently, because it minimized marine-peril-related
allocative inefficiency (if one follows the above convention).
Somewhat more concretely, on this latter articulation, the
most-allocatively-efficient State response to marine-peril-
related contingencies would be the response that minimized
the sum of marine-peril-related allocative transaction costs,
the misallocation caused by various private parties' marine-
peril-related-loss avoidance-decisions, and the non-
transaction-cost misallocation caused by financing any
marine-peril-related public policies.
Because the approach to allocative-efficiency analysis
that I think is third-best allocatively efficient focuses on the
disparate conditions under which various types of allocative
inefficiency will be generated, the allocative-efficiency
analyses that follow focus on the impact that various State
responses to marine-peril contingencies will have on the
various types of misallocation as opposed to the various
types of allocative costs they will affect. However, because it
will be easier to appreciate the various possibly-
misallocative types of resource-use decisions on which the
following analyses will focus if one is aware of the different
types of allocative costs that can be affected by State
responses to marine-peril-related contingencies, I will list
the various relevant categories of costs in this section before
listing in Section Three the various types of marine-peril-
related misallocation that can be generated.
It is useful to distinguish ten types of allocative costs
that marine losses or marine-peril contingencies can
generate:
16. For a critique of this tradition in economics, see Guido Calabresi, The
Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1218-19
(1991).
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(1) the fixed allocative cost of marine-salvage
operations' 7 (net of any allocative gains that specially-
constructed, specially-adapted salvage ships generate when
performing non-salvage services that they could not
otherwise have supplied, such as towing)-for example, the
allocative cost of building marine-salvage ships, of adapting
passenger and cargo ships to make them more cost-effective
marine salvors,"8 of hiring officers and crew members to
supply marine-salvage services, of training such personnel
to supply such services, and of placing ships in positions
that increase their marine-rescue productivity;
(2) the variable non-environmental allocative cost of
rescue attempts-for example, allocative fuel costs, the
allocative cost of wearing out marine-rescue ships and
equipment, the allocative cost that is generated when
marine-rescue ships and equipment are damaged or lost,
the allocative cost that is generated when marine-rescue
personnel are injured or killed, the allocative cost that is
generated when passengers and cargo on semi-professional
or casual salvaging ships are injured/killed or damaged/lost,
the allocative cost of delaying the arrival of passengers and
cargo at their destination, and the allocative opportunity
cost generated when the salvaging ship's rescue-efforts
require it to forego other opportunities;
(3) the variable environmental allocative cost of rescue-
attempts-for example, the allocative cost generated when a
salvor releases some of the oil a tanker is carrying to lighten
the ship to facilitate its rescue;
17. For example, according to Wayne Brough, "[s]alvage tugs are equipped
with chain (4,500 feet), excess electrical power, towing winches, air compressors,
cranes, and many other pieces of equipment unique to rescue operations."
Brough, supra note 10, at 98.
18. In my terminology, "professional marine salvors" operate ships that are
specially designed to effectuate marine rescues with personnel that have been
primarily selected and trained to perform marine rescues. "Semi-professional
marine salvors" operate ships that have been primarily designed to perform
other functions but have been altered or equipped to some extent to perform
marine rescues with personnel who were primarily selected and trained to
perform other functions but may also have been selected and trained to some
extent to perform marine rescues. "Casual marine salvors" operate ships whose
construction and equipment have not been influenced at all by the possibility of
their attempting marine rescues and use personnel whose selection and training
was not at all affected by this possibility.
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(4) the allocative cost of lost or damaged salvage-that
is, lost or damaged ships, lost or damaged cargo, and
passenger, crew, and officer injuries and deaths;
(5) the environmental allocative costs marine accidents
generate that cannot be attributed to salvor efforts-that is,
oil spills, leaks of other toxic materials, shipping-lane
blockages, or the rusting of sunken ships that salvor-efforts
did not actively cause but also did not prevent;
(6) the allocative cost of potential-rescuee avoidance-
moves-for example, the allocative costs or allocative losses
(salvage-losses aside) that are generated by decisions not to
purchase passenger or cargo ships, to buy ships with thicker
hulls, to keep on board spare parts, such as propellers and
engine components, to hire more and better-trained
mechanics, to give officers and crew more safety-training, to
pack cargo in water-resistant or flame-resistant containers,
to stow cargo in safer positions, to reduce the physical
volume, value, vulnerability, or dangerousness of the cargo
carried, to reduce the number, vulnerability, and wealth
(life-value) of the passengers transported, to reduce the
number of trips each ship operated makes in any given time
period, to travel by more circuitous but safer routes, to
travel at safer times of the year, to travel under safer
weather conditions,' 9 etc.;
(7) the marine-peril-related risk costs that marine
salvors and potential victims of marine peril bear;
(8) the allocative transaction costs generated by (A) the
marine-peril-related policies the government adopts, (B) the
policies the government adopts to finance its marine-peril-
related policies, (C) the consideration, formation, and
enforcement of marine-peril-related insurance contracts, (D)
the consideration, formulation, and enforcement of any
marine-salvage contracts relevant parties contemplate
entering into or actually enter into, and (E) the
implementation of any government-transfer or bankruptcy
policies that marine losses call into play;
(9) the non-transaction-cost allocative cost of (that is
the non-transaction-cost misallocation generated by) any
choices the government made to finance its marine-peril-
19. Some of the items in this list are taken from Note, Calculating and




related policies-the sum of the misallocation generated by
(A) any additional taxes that are levied to finance the
policies in question, (B) any price increases the government
effectuates for goods and services it supplies to pay for the
relevant policies, (C) any inflation the government causes
by using deficit financing to pay for the policies in question,
and (D) any decision the government makes to "finance" the
relevant policies by foregoing other allocatively-efficient
expenditures; and
(10) any external-distributive-preference value-related
net external costs (or net external benefits) generated by the
relevant marine perils and government policies.
II. THE POSSIBLE COMPONENTS OF THE MOST-
ALLOCATIVELY- EFFICIENT RESPONSE A STATE CAN MAKE TO
MARINE-PERIL CONTINGENCIES
A wide variety of policies might be components of the
most-allocatively-efficient State response to marine-peril-
related contingencies:
(1) government choices to supply rescue services itself;
(2) government policies about the pricing or other
methods of financing of such government-supplied rescue-
services;
(3) government subsidies paid to or taxes levied on
private professional marine salvors;
(4) government regulations of the attributes of salvage
boats and the qualifications and training of their owners,
officers, and crews;
(5) government licensing schemes for marine salvors
(that determine both the number and attributes of
professional and semi-professional salvors);
(6) government regulations about the geographic
disposition of salvage boats;
(7) government imposition of a legal duty to rescue on
potential salvors in specified situations;
(8) government regulations, backed up by civil fines
and/or the possibility of license cancellations, controlling
which potential salvor(s) may attempt a rescue when more
than one potential rescuer is in position to make such an
attempt;
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(9) government regulations, backed up by civil fines
and/or the possibility of license cancellations, of the
priorities that should guide any rescue attempt that is made
and/or of the methods a salvor may or must employ when
attempting a rescue;
(10) government financial-compensation schemes for
those who have attempted to perform a marine rescue or
have succeeded in such an attempt (schemes that may make
the salvor's award depend either exclusively or inter alia on
whether the salvor was supposed to attempt the rescue, on
whether he made his attempt with a ship that departed
from a government-approved location, and on whether his
attempt used the recommended techniques);
(11) government finance schemes that finance awards
to those who have attempted marine rescues from taxes or
fees levied on those who ship goods over the seas, who
travel on the seas, and/or who provide marine-transport
services;
(12) government decisions to impose fines on any
salvor whose rescue efforts generated environmental
damage (for example, who released oil from an imperiled
ship to facilitate its rescue) or to establish a private-law
right of those who have been harmed by any oil spill or
other hazardous-substance spill that the salvor caused to
recover those losses from the salvor (perhaps combined with
a policy of requiring all salvors to insure against this
contingency);
(13) government policies (license schemes, tax. or
subsidy policies) designed to control the number of
passenger ships and/or freighters in operation;
(14) government regulations of the attributes of ships
that travel the seas (for example, of the thickness of the
hulls of ships that carry certain types of cargo or travel
certain routes);
(15) government regulations backed up by civil fines
and/or the possibility of a restriction on the types of cargo
that may be shipped;
(16) government regulations of the way in which cargo
of different types must be stowed;
(17) government regulations of the safety training of
ship officers and crew;
(18) government regulations of the routes ships may
take, the times of the year they may operate on certain
2011]
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routes, and/or the weather conditions under which they may
operate (with certain cargo, at certain times of the year,
along certain routes);
(19) government choices to compensate salvors who
have made appropriate rescue attempts or have succeeded
in rescuing ships, cargo, and/or lives or in preventing
environmental damage;
(20) government decisions to confer a legal right on
those who have attempted a marine rescue or have
succeeded in rescuing ships, cargo, and lives or preventing
spills that would have damaged the environment to obtain
compensation from the beneficiaries of their salvage
activities--compensation that might be made to vary with
the fixed cost of the salvor, the variable cost of the salvage
attempt, the weighted-average-expected benefits of the
rescue attempt, and/or many other factors; and
(21) various other policies the government could devise
to alter the distributive consequences of marine-peril-
related contingencies and various decisions that might
otherwise cause allocative inefficiency that could be affected
by marine-peril risks-for example, various government-
transfer-to-individuals programs (Medicare, welfare,
disability insurance, unemployment insurance, widow's
benefits policies), corporate-bailout programs, and
individual and business bankruptcy policies.
III. THE SECOND- BEST-ALLOCATIVELY- EFFICIENT APPROACH
FOR COURTS TO TAKE TO DETERMINE THE COMPENSATION
THAT THE BENEFICIARIES OF MARINE RESCUES ARE REQUIRED
TO PAY THOSE OF THEIR "RESCUERS"2 WHO HAVE NOT BEEN
ABLE TO NEGOTIATE BINDING PRICES FOR THEIR SERVICES
Second-best-allocative-efficiency ("SBLE") analysis
proceeds on the assumption that the analyst can execute all
20. This way of posing the issue assumes that only successful rescuers will be
able to secure compensation from the potential beneficiaries of their rescue
attempts. Although this is a feature of our current law and Landes and Posner
have attempted to argue for its allocative efficiency, see Landes & Posner, supra
note 4, at 104, a system that entitles unsuccessful as well as successful rescue-
attempters to obtain compensation from their efforts' potential beneficiaries
might in fact be more allocatively efficient. See infra text accompanying notes
48-50.
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relevant theoretical analyses perfectly and costlessly and
can collect perfect data on all the parameters that such
theoretical analyses reveal to be relevant without
generating any allocative costs. This section examines the
approach that would be second-best allocatively efficient
(also symbolized as SBLE) for courts or anyone else to take
to determining the compensation that would be most
allocatively efficient for courts to require marine-rescue
beneficiaries to pay their rescuers when the parties have
not negotiated a binding price for the rescue-service.
The first point I wish to make about this approach is
that rather than focusing exclusively on the allocative costs
that marine-peril-related contingencies will generate, which
were listed in Section One, this approach focuses on the
marine-peril-related "misallocation" that is generated. The
word "misallocation" is enquoted because I am using it to
refer not only to (1) the misallocation properly so-called that
is generated by the various types of marine-loss avoidance-
decisions that are made and (2) the non-transaction-cost
misallocation that is generated by the financing of marine-
peril-related policies but also to (3) the various types of
marine-peril-related allocative costs that economists
implicitly and misleadingly classify as "misallocations."
More specifically, the analysis that follows focuses on the
misallocation generated by five types of private marine-loss-
avoidance decisions, the non-transaction-cost misallocation
generated by the public financing of the relevant State
responses to the marine-peril contingency, any external-
distributive-preference/value-related net external cost (or
benefit) generated by the combination of the marine-peril
contingency and the policy under consideration, and the
difference between the allocative transaction costs the
marine-peril contingency generates (which costs economists
misleadingly treat as misallocations) and any reduction in
allocative risk costs some of the transactions or policies in
question generate.
Some elaboration may be useful. The five private-
avoidance-decision misallocations are:
(1) the amount of misallocation caused by the fixed-cost
choices of potential marine rescuers (choices about
constructing salvage ships, adapting non-salvage ships,
hiring and training officers and crew, and deploying ships
that could effectuate marine rescues);
(2) the amount of misallocation caused by the number
of rescue attempts that are executed, given the fixed-
20111
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salvage-cost decisions that potential salvors have made-
that is, the amount of misallocation associated with the
quantity of variable rescue-attempt costs that potential
rescuers incur;
(3) the amount of misallocation caused by the attributes
of the rescue attempts that are made-that is, the
misallocation that results because, given the amount of
resources consumed by the fixed-cost and variable-cost
expenditures of potential rescuers, allocative efficiency
would have been higher had a different set of rescue
attempts been made;
(4) the amount of misallocation caused by the various
avoidance-choices made by potential marine rescuees-
delineated in item six of Section One's list of marine-peril-
related allocative costs; and
(5) the misallocation generated by decisions of owners
of imperiled ships to reject or accept offers of rescue
assistance.
The non-transaction-cost misallocation properly so-
called that is generated by the public financing of the State
response to the relevant marine-peril contingencies are
delineated in item nine of Section One's list of marine-peril-
related "costs." The marine-peril-related allocative
transaction costs that economists misleadingly implicitly
treat as misallocations appear in item eight of Section One's
list. The reduction in allocative risk costs the referenced
transactions or policies effectuate are the reductions
generated by private marine-loss-insurance policies,
relevant government-transfer programs, and bankruptcy
laws. The external-distributive-preference/value-related
sum, which most economists think should not be considered
in any allocative-efficiency analysis,2' is the sum that
appears as item ten of Section One's "allocative cost of
marine peril" list.
In brief, I believe that the third-best-allocatively-
efficient approach to analyzing the allocative efficiency of
any State response to marine-peril contingencies will focus
on the above mixed list of misallocations and allocative costs
rather than on Section One's allocative-cost list because I
21. For the arguments that economists make to support this conclusion and
my reasons for rejecting them, see Richard S. Markovits, Book Review, 115
ETHICS 593, 593-94, 597 (2005). See also MARKOVITS, supra note 13, at 31-34.
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believe it will be cost-effective to use various Welfare
Economics theories to assess the impact of any policy on the
five private-avoidance-decision-generated misallocations in
this section's list (as well the impact of any policy on the
non-transaction-cost public-finance-generated misallocation
that appears in both lists).
The second point I wish to make about the second-best-
allocatively-efficient approach to identifying the most-
allocatively-efficient award a court could make to a
successful salvor is that it is highly complicated. Indeed,
even if one could ignore everything but the effect of any
award on the amount of misallocation generated by private
marine-loss-avoidance decisions, the relevant analysis
would be rendered complicated by the following three
realities:
(1) the fact that the award granted would affect five
types of avoidance-decisions and avoidance-decision
misallocation-a fact made salient by the reality that,
almost certainly, no individual award will be able to
eliminate all types of private-avoidance-move misallocation
(for example, that the award that would provide potential
salvors with economically efficient incentives to make fixed-
cost [background] decisions will not provide potential
salvors with economically efficient variable-cost incentives
or potential rescuees with economically efficient incentives
to make foregone decisions to avoid marine perils or to
accept offers of rescue services, etc.);
(2) the fact that the private benefits and private costs of
various marine-loss avoidance-decisions are distorted by
various Pareto imperfections that admiralty-law doctrine
did not cause-for example, the externalities that are
generated when decisions by potential rescuers to make
rescue attempts reduce the allocative benefits generated by
other rescue attempts made on the same body of salvage (by
reducing the likelihood that they will be successful) and
various imperfections in price competition, which "distort"22
22. In my terminology, a private cost, benefit, or profit figure is "distorted" to
the extent that it diverges from its allocative counterpart. Relatedly, a private
cost, benefit, or profit figure is said to be ceteris paribus distorted by some
Pareto imperfection if that imperfection would distort the private figure in
question in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world ("if other things were equal").
More specifically, in my terminology, a private figure is said to be "deflated" to
the extent that it is higher than its allocative counterpart.
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the private fixed cost of building a salvage ship, the private
variable cost of a rescue attempt, the private cost to a
potential rescuer of avoiding by taking a longer but safer
route or building or buying a safer cargo or passenger ship,
etc.;23 and
23. Some explanation is in order. I will focus on the way in which
imperfections in price competition can distort the private cost of the resources
that salvors use to construct salvage ships and execute rescue-attempts and
that potential rescuees use to execute "resource-consuming" avoidance-moves-
i.e., that can cause these private costs to diverge from their allocative
counterpart. The starting-point is to note that the private costs that potential
marine rescuers and rescuees must incur to obtain the relevant resources equal
(or infinitesimally exceed) the private value these resources would have for their
alternative users whom the potential rescuers and rescuees must outbid for the
resources in question, while the allocative cost that is generated by the relevant
"fixed cost of salvage operations," "variable cost of rescue-attempts," and
"potential-rescuee marine-loss-avoidance" resource-uses equals the allocative
value that the resources in question would have generated in the alternative
uses to which they would have been devoted had they not been used by potential
marine rescuers and rescuees. This point implies that imperfections in price
competition will distort the private cost of resource-consuming marine-loss-
avoidance resource-uses to the extent that they cause the private value of the
resources in question to their alternative users to diverge from the allocative
value the resources in question would have generated in their alternative users'
employ. The way in which imperfections in price competition will cause this last
type of divergence will vary with the function that the resources in question
would perform in the alternative (non-marine-loss-avoidance) use-i.e., will vary
according to whether the resources would otherwise be used to increase the unit
output of an existing product, to create a new product, or to execute a
production-process-research project (designed to reduce the private or allocative
cost of producing a relevant quantity of an existing product). To save space, I
will assume that all the resources that are allocated to marine-peril-loss
avoidance would otherwise be used to increase the unit output of existing
products. Now assume in addition that the unit-output producers who would
otherwise use the resources devoted to marine-loss avoidance are imperfect
competitors who face downward-sloping demand curves and do not engage in
price discrimination (because they do not find it profitable to do so). Since the
private value of the resources in question to these unit-output producers-the
marginal revenue product the resources will yield them-is a function of the
marginal revenue they would obtain by selling the units of output the resources
would enable them to produce while the allocative value these resources would
generate in these alternative users' employ is a function of the price for which
the units of output the relevant resources would enable them to produce could
be sold (is a function of the value of the relevant units of output to their
consumers rather than to their producers), the fact that marginal revenue is
less than price for unit-output producers who face downward-sloping demand
curves and do not engage in price discrimination implies that, to the extent that
the alternative employer of any resources devoted to marine-loss avoidance is a
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(3) the fact that both the profitability and the allocative
efficiency of the various marine-loss avoidance-moves in
question are interdependent and that, as a result, marine-
salvage awards will affect the profitability and allocative
efficiency of any given avoidance-decision that any given
actor could make not only directly but also indirectly by
affecting the various avoidance-decisions that other actors
make.24
To simplify the exposition, I will focus here on the
approach that I think constitutes the second-best-
non-discriminating unit-output producer who faces imperfect price competition,
the private cost of the relevant marine-loss-avoidance resource-uses will be less
than their allocative cost. For a more detailed analysis of the above distortion
and analyses of the ways in which imperfections in price competition (and other
Pareto imperfections) will distort the private value of resources to choosers who
would use them to create new products or execute production-process-research
projects, see Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of
First-Best-Allocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best
World: The Whys and Some Therefores, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 313, 346-64
(1996); Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to
Increase Research and Development: A Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust,
Intellectual Property, and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 63, 78- 101 (2002); MARKOVITS, supra note 13, at 89-137.
24. I will illustrate the relevant complications by analyzing the impact of an
increase in salvage awards on the number of salvage ships that are constructed.
Obviously, the direct impact of increases in individual salvage awards on the
number of salvage ships that are built will be positive. However, the indirect
impact of salvage-award increases on the number of salvage ships constructed
cannot be predicted on a priori grounds. In the one direction, higher individual
awards will tend to have an indirect negative impact on the number of salvage
ships constructed (the profits a salvage ship can earn) (1) by decreasing the
number of rescue opportunities any given salvage ship will have (A) by
increasing the amount of avoidance in which potential rescuees engage by
increasing the cost to them of any rescue services for which they must pay and
(B) by increasing the percentage of rescue offers that potential rescuees reject
and (2) by increasing the number of rescue attempts that will be made on any
given imperiled ship that accepts offers of help or is not in a position to reject
rescue-service offers, controlling for the number of salvage ships in operation. In
the other direction, higher individual awards will tend to have an indirect
positive impact on the number of salvage ships constructed (the profits a
salvage ship can earn) by increasing the number of rescue opportunities any
given salvage ship will have by reducing the amount of avoidance in which
potential rescuees engage by reducing the probability that their ship, cargo,
officers, crew, and passengers will be lost if they become imperiled by increasing
the probability that one or more rescue-attempts will be made on them if they
are imperiled.
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allocatively-efficient way to determine the award that would
minimize total private marine-loss avoidance-decision
misallocation-that is, I will ignore any differences in the
impact that different awards would have on (1) allocative
transaction costs, (2) allocative risk costs, (3) the non-
transaction-cost misallocation that the public financing of
the relevant admiralty-law and insurance-law
adjudications, government transfers, and bankruptcy
proceedings would generate, and (4) net external-
distributive-preference/value-related equivalent-dollar
gains or losses. 5
Unfortunately, even given this simplification, space
constraints preclude me from doing more than outlining the
approach that I think would be second-best allocatively
efficient for a court system to take to identifying the most-
allocatively-efficient award to require marine rescuers to
pay their salvors. Rather than working through the kind of
factually-detailed numerical example whose analysis would
best reveal the SBLE (and TBLE) approach,26 the text will
25. This note will make some observations on these issues. Obviously, the
execution of the SBLE approach will generate considerable allocative
transaction costs directly, given that it will take all Pareto imperfections and
feedback effects into account. These allocative transaction costs (as well as the
impossibility of collecting perfect data on all relevant parameters) account for
the difference between the approach that is SBLE and the approach that is
third-best allocatively efficient ("TBLE"). The impact of the SBLE approach on
the amount of allocative transaction cost generated by marine-loss insurance-
policies, marine-loss-related government-transfer programs, and marine-loss-
related bankruptcy proceedings obviously depends on the impact of the SBLE
award formula on the risk that potential rescuees bear, on the number of
individuals that marine losses render eligible for government transfers, and on
the number of individuals and companies that marine losses force into
bankruptcy. The SBLE award formula affects marine-peril-related risk costs not
only directly by affecting the loss that actual rescuees sustain once the award is
taken into account but also by affecting the probability that they will be rescued
if imperiled. The non-transaction-cost public-finance-related misallocation that
will be generated by the use of any marine-salvage-award formula will increase
with the transaction cost of its use and the amount by which its use increases
the number of government-transfer payments requested, the magnitude of any
government-transfer payments made, and the number of bankruptcies that
must be processed. The impact of the SBLE award-formula or external-
distributive-preference/value-related equivalent-dollar gains or losses depends
not only on the size of the awards that are SBLE but on the substance of the
relevant population's external-distributive preferences or values.
26. For an analysis that develops and works through such an example, see
Richard S. Markovits, Marine Salvage Policy and the Law of Marine Salvage: A
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delineate the various components of the SBLE approach
and explain one of those components-namely, the
calculation of the award (the determination of the award
formula) that would eliminate any distortion in the
profitability of each type of marine-loss-avoidance decision I
previously distinguished.
The SBLE approach to determining the award that
would be allocatively efficient to require marine rescuees to
pay rescuers who have not been able to negotiate binding
prices for their services has three steps:
(1) determine for each marine-loss avoidance-decision
the award formula that would yield awards that would
eliminate any distortion in the profitability of the
avoidance-move in question (or would yield a set of
distortions in the profitability of the relevant type of
avoidance-move for relevant potential avoiders that would
perfectly offset any errors the relevant potential avoiders
would commit when deciding whether to make or reject the
type of avoidance-decision in question);
(2) for each type of marine-loss-avoidance-move
decision, calculate the amount of marine-loss-avoidance-
decision misallocation that would be generated if the set of
awards the courts required to be paid deviated to different
extents in either direction from the awards that would
eliminate the misallocation caused by choices to make or
reject the type of avoidance-decision in question; and
(3) taking account of the fact that different award
formulas and, relatedly, different sets of awards would
eliminate the misallocation generated by the different types
of marine-loss-avoidance decisions that can be made,
determine the award formula (set of awards across all
cases) that would minimize the total amount of marine-loss-
avoidance-decision-generated misallocation.
I will now elaborate on the first of these three steps by
discussing the marine-salvor-compensation awards that
would eliminate the distortion in the profits that would be
yielded by the respective types of marine-loss-avoidance
decisions. I begin with potential-marine-rescuee decisions to
accept or reject offers of marine-rescue services. Sovereign,
maximizing potential rescuees will reject an offer of
First-Best, Second-Best, and Third-Best Allocative-Efficiency Analysis (Jan. 10,
2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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allocatively efficient rescue-services only if the certainty-
equivalent private benefits27 of accepting such an offer are
lower than the certainty-equivalent private cost of doing so
(the certainty-equivalent award the potential rescuee
reckons with paying)-that is, only if (1) the private benefits
of accepting such an offer are critically deflated while the
private cost of doing so is undistorted, (2) the private cost of
accepting such an offer is critically inflated while the
private benefits of doing so are undistorted, or (3) the net
effect of the distortions (inflations and/or deflations) in both
the private benefits and the private costs of accepting such
an offer critically deflates the profitability of doing so.
Similarly, sovereign, maximizing potential rescuees will
accept an offer of allocatively inefficient rescue services only
if the certainty-equivalent private benefits the related
performance should be expected to generate exceed the
certainty-equivalent private cost the performance should be
expected to impose on the potential rescuee-that is, only if
(1) the private benefits of accepting such an offer are
critically inflated while the private cost is undistorted, (2)
the private cost of accepting such an offer is critically
deflated while the private benefits are undistorted, or (3)
the net effect of the distortions (inflations and/or deflations)
in both the private benefits and the private costs of
accepting the offer critically inflates the profitability of
doing so (renders acceptance profitable though allocatively
inefficient). In order to simplify the exposition that follows, I
will assume that (1) the offer in question is made in
circumstances in which no binding agreement can be
formed, (2) the offered rescue-service has (A) an X%
probability of rescuing $Y in salvage that would otherwise
clearly be lost (where $Y stands for the private value of the
rescued salvage to the owner of the imperiled ship) and (B)
a 0% probability of rescuing any other amount of salvage or
preventing or causing any environmental loss, (3) the
private cost to the potential rescuer of the offered rescue
attempt is $Z, (4) all rescue service offerors and potential
acceptors are risk-neutral, (5) the acceptance/rejection
decision is made either by the owner of the imperiled ship or
by someone whose goal is to maximize the interests of this
27. The certainty-equivalent private benefits equal the sum of the weighted
average benefits the rescue attempt is expected to confer on the potential
rescuee and the amount by which the rescue attempt is expected to reduce his
risk costs.
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ship owner, and (6) the individual who makes the
acceptance/rejection decision makes the choice that does
maximize the ship owner's profits.
On these assumptions, if the economy is otherwise-
Pareto-perfect, the private profitability of a potential
rescuee's accepting the relevant rescue-attempt offer will be
undistorted (no rescue-offer acceptance/rejection
misallocation will be generated if the potential rescuee is a
sovereign maximizer) if the judicially-adopted compensation
formula requires courts to order potential rescuees who
have received offers of rescue services to pay successful
rescuers whose offers they accepted-that is, X% of the
potential rescuers whose offers they accepted-
(100%/X%)($Z). In brief, under the assumptions now being
made, such an award formula would cause the profits the
potential rescuee would earn by accepting any offer of
assistance to equal the allocative efficiency of his doing so
since (1) it would equate the private cost to the potential
rescuee of accepting the offer with the allocative cost of his
doing so ([X%][100%/X%][$Z] where $Z equals not only the
private but also the allocative cost of the offered rescue
attempt) and (2) the applicable otherwise-Pareto-perfect
assumptions guarantee both (A) that (as just stated) $Z
equal not only the private cost but also the allocative cost of
the offered rescue attempt and (B) that $Y equal not only
the private value of the salvage that might be rescued to the
potential rescuee but also the allocative benefits any
successful rescue attempt would generate). Relatedly, on
our current assumptions, any compensation-award formula
that required a rescuee to pay more than (100%/X%)($Z) to
his successful rescuer would tend to misallocate resources
by inducing potential rescuees to reject offers of allocatively
efficient rescue services-in particular, would lead to the
rejection of allocatively efficient rescue services whenever
the mandated compensation-award C exceeds
(100%/X%)($Z) by more than the amount by which the
offered rescue service would increase allocative efficiency.28
28. Although the award of Cs below (100%/X%)$Y could also misallocate
resources by inducing potential rescuees to accept offers of allocatively
inefficient rescue services if any such offers were made, on our current
assumptions, this possibility can be ignored since no allocatively inefficient
rescue service offers will be made under the relevant award conditions.
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Of course, in our actual, highly-Pareto-imperfect world,
one will have to alter the award formula to counteract the
tendency of the other imperfections present in the system to
distort the profitability of accepting an offer of rescue
services. Thus, in our actual economy, the following
imperfections will distort the profitability of accepting the
offer of rescue services if (on our other assumptions) C is set
at (100%/X%)($Z):
(1) the external benefits that the acceptance of the
rescue service offer should be expected to generate because
the relevant rescue attempt should be predicted to increase
the probability that imperiled-ship passenger-and-personnel
lives for whose loss the owner of the imperiled ship might
not be liable or might not have to pay (because he was
insured or judgment-proof) would be saved;
(2) the external benefits that the acceptance of the
rescue-service offer should be expected to generate because
the relevant rescue attempt should be predicted to increase
the probability that cargo for whose loss the owner of the
imperiled ship might not be liable or might not have to pay
(because he was insured or judgment-proof) would be saved;
(3) the external benefits the acceptance of the rescue-
service offer should be expected to generate because the
relevant rescue attempt should be expected to increase the
probability that the imperiled ship would be saved when the
owner of the imperiled ship might be insured for any such
loss or might be judgment-proof;
(4) the external benefits that the acceptance of the
rescue-service offer should be expected to generate because
the relevant rescue attempt should be predicted to reduce
the weighted-average-expected environmental loss the
ship's imperilment would yield in circumstances in which
the owner of the imperiled ship might not be liable or might
not have to pay (because he would not be liable for the loss
or would be insured against or judgment-proof in relation to
any such environmental losses for which he would be legally
responsible); and
(5) the imperfections in competition or other Pareto
imperfections not yet discussed that would distort the
profitability of accepting a rescue-service offer by distorting
the private cost of the offered rescue attempt or the private
value of the cargo and ship that might be saved.
Since the first four imperfections listed above all tend to
deflate the profitability of accepting a rescue-service offer,
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their presence would reduce the C that would eliminate any
distortion in the profitability of accepting such an offer
below (100%/X%)($Z) on our assumptions. The
imperfections to which item five in the above list refers (1)
will reduce the C in question to the extent that they deflate
the private value to the owner of the imperiled ship of the
cargo and ship that might be saved (since that deflation will
deflate his incentives to save those assets, ceteris paribus)
or to the extent that they inflate the private cost of the
offered rescue service to the potential rescuer and (2) will
increase the C in question to the extent that they inflate the
private value of the relevant cargo and ship to the ship
owner (in whose interest I am assuming the
acceptance/rejection decision is being made) and to the
extent that they deflate the private cost of the offered rescue
attempt (since, ceteris paribus, that deflation will cause the
profits the potential rescuee can realize by accepting the
rescue-service offer to be inflated).
A. A Final Reminder
The preceding analysis assumed that the individual
who chose whether to accept or reject the offered rescue
attempt would make the choice that was in the interest of
the owner of the imperiled ship. If the relevant chooser was
trying to maximize some other objective function or was not
a sovereign maximizer, one would probably have to adjust
the C-formula on these accounts to award Cs that would
prevent any misallocation from being generated by rescue-
offer acceptance/rejection decisions.
A second type of marine-loss-avoidance decision relates
to the characteristics of any individual rescue attempt that
is made and of the set of rescue attempts that are made,
given the total variable costs that the relevant rescue
attempts generate. This type of avoidance-decision
generates misallocation when, given the amount of
resources devoted to rescuing a given imperiled ship,
rescuing its cargo, passengers, and personnel, and reducing
the environmental damage the relevant marine peril
generates, the amount of allocative benefits generated are
lower than they could have been. Such misallocation can
arise for two basic reasons: (1) because the C-formula in use
rewards successful salvors different percentages of the
different kinds of allocative benefits their rescue efforts
generate or (2) because the C-formula in use does not
reward the salvor for altering his rescue attempt to increase
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the allocative benefits other rescue attempters generate and
does not reduce the award given a salvor to reflect the fact
that the particular rescue attempt he executed reduced the
allocative benefits other salvors generated (by more than
alternative attempts he could have made would have done).
As Section Six points out, although the current United
States salvage law does reduce the award a salvor obtains if
his rescue effort unnecessarily interferes with the rescue
attempts of others, it has at least two features that cause it
to generate this type of misallocation for the first of the
above two reasons:
(1) it does not award salvors for reducing the
environmental allocative losses the marine peril generates
and does not penalize salvors for causing environmental
losses (say, by releasing oil to lighten tankers to facilitate
their rescue); and
(2) it does not compensate salvors for saving lives
unless they also save ships or cargo-a feature that will
deflate the profitability of saving lives when no other type of
salvage is rescued and will inflate the profitability of saving
cargo or a ship when one or more lives have been or could be
saved.
In any event, to prevent this type of misallocation from
being generated, the C-award formula should not treat
differently the kinds of allocative benefits marine-rescue
attempts can generate and should make a successful
salvor's award depend, inter alia, on the effects his attempt
had on the allocative-efficiency gains generated by the other
rescue attempts made on the salvage in question.
A third type of marine-loss-avoidance decision that
needs to be distinguished is whether to attempt a marine
rescue at all. Decisions of this type will be misallocative
when, given the fixed-cost (background) decisions that have
been made, the wrong number of rescue attempts are made
on a given imperiled ship from the perspective of allocative
efficiency. In an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world (in which
the potential rescuer would make the choice that was in his
best interest, the private variable cost of his rescue attempt
would equal its allocative variable cost, and the private
benefits his rescue attempt would confer on the owner of the
imperiled ship would equal the allocative benefits it would
generate), the C-award that would eliminate any
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misallocation of this kind would be an award equal to the
"market value"29 of any rescued salvage, which will equal
the private benefits the rescue attempt conferred on the
owner of the imperiled ship since, in an otherwise-Pareto-
perfect world, he would either own everything that was
saved or would have to compensate the owners of the
relevant salvage fully for any loss they sustained and (2)
there would be no difference between the market value of
the salvage and its value to its owner. Before explaining
why-in our actual, highly-Pareto-imperfect world-such a
C would be unlikely to eliminate any misallocation of this
kind (by equating the ex ante profitability and allocative
efficiency of any possible rescue attempt), I want to point
out that the C in question will almost always substantially
differ from the C that would prevent potential rescuees from
making allocatively inefficient rescue-offer acceptance/
rejection decisions in a Pareto-perfect-world-namely, a C
equal to the product of the private cost of the rescue attempt
in question and (100% divided by the probability that this
rescue-attempt would be successful). In a Pareto-perfect
world (and almost certainly in our actual, highly-Pareto-
imperfect world), no C will be able to prevent both these
types of misallocation-even if the C in question would
affect no other type of misallocation, the most-allocatively-
efficient C would be the C that generated the smallest
amount of marine-peril-related misallocation that any C
would generate, not the C that eliminated all marine-peril-
related misallocation.
In any event, even if I assume that the decision to offer
to make and to actually make a rescue attempt would be the
decision that would maximize the interest of the potential
salvor, various Pareto imperfections would cause the
profitability of a rescue attempt to the potential rescuer to
diverge from its allocative efficiency when the compensation
he would receive if successful equaled the market value of
the salvage he rescued. At least four sets of such
imperfections are worth distinguishing:
(1) the net environmental allocative benefits the rescue
attempt will generate, which will (in general) be external to
the owner of the imperiled ship and in any event would not
29. The quotation marks are inserted to acknowledge the problematic
character of this notion in relation to lives saved.
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be reflected in any award whose calculation ignored their
existence;
(2) the externalities the rescue attempt will generate
because-even if no alternative, otherwise-equally-
allocatively-efficient rescue attempt the salvor in question
could have made would have generated a smaller reduction
in the ex ante allocative efficiency of other salvors' rescue
attempts-the successful rescue attempt did reduce the ex
ante allocative efficiency of the rescue attempts others
made;"
30. Assume for simplicity that rescue attempts come in only one form and
that at most one rescue attempt will be successful. If the probability that a
given body of salvage will be rescued increases less than proportionately with
the number of rescue attempts that are made, each successive rescue attempt
that is made will reduce the probability that the other rescue attempts will be
successful. To see why this externality can cause misallocation, assume that (1)
the private and allocative value of the salvage is $1,000,000, (2) the private and
allocative cost of each rescue attempt is $200,000, (3) either all or none of the
salvage will be rescued, (4) the probability of rescue is 40% if one rescue attempt
is made, 65% if two rescue attempts are made, 75% if three rescue attempts are
made, 81% if four rescue attempts are made, and 85% if five rescue attempts are
made, (5) if more than one rescue attempt is made, each rescue-attempter will
be equally likely to succeed, (6) everyone involved is risk-neutral, and (7) a
successful rescue-attempter will be awarded the full value of the salvage he
rescues-$1,000,000. On these assumptions, four rescue attempts will be made,
the allocatively efficient number of rescue attempts will be two, and the
misallocation that will be generated by the third and fourth rescue attempts will
be $140,000. To see why four rescue attempts will be made, note that if four are
made each attempter will perceive ex ante that he has a 20.25%=(1/4)81%
chance of securing the $1,000,000 award and hence the revenue each will expect
his rescue attempt to yield him on the weighted average
([20.25%]$1,000,000=$202,500) will exceed the private cost of his attempting a
rescue ($200,000), while if five rescue attempts are made each attempter will
perceive ex ante that he has a 1 7%=(1/5)85% chance of receiving the $1,000,000
award and hence the revenue each will expect his rescue attempt to yield him
on the weighted average ([17%]$1,000,000=$170,000) will be lower than the
private cost of his making the rescue-attempt ($200,000). To see why the
number of rescue attempts that will be most allocatively efficient is two, note
that (1) the first rescue attempt will yield allocative benefits of
(40%)$1,000,000=$400,000 and allocative costs of $200,000, (2) the second
rescue attempt will yield allocative benefits of (65%-40%)$1,000,000=$250,000
and allocative costs of $200,000, (3) the third rescue attempt will yield allocative
benefits of (75%-65%)$1,000,000=$100,000 and allocative costs of $200,000, and
(4) the fourth rescue attempt will yield allocative benefits of (81%-
75%)$1,000,000=$60,000 and allocative costs of $200,000. The last two results
imply that in the situation in question the last two rescue attempts will have
misallocated resources by $100,000 and $140,000 respectively-that is, by a
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(3) the external costs the rescue attempt will generate
because, even if no one rescued the salvage in question, it
might not have been lost;3 and
total of $240,000. The reason that the third rescue attempt was ex ante
profitable despite its allocative inefficiency-namely, yielded ex ante profits of
25%($1,000,000)-$100,000=$50,000 while decreasing ex ante allocative
efficiency by $100,000-is that the allocative cost the third rescue attempt
generated by reducing the probability that the first two rescue-attempters
would be successful by 15% from 65% to 75%-25%=50% (the attendant reduction
of $150,000 in the ex ante allocative benefits the first two rescue attempts
should have been predicted on the weighted average to generate) was external
to the third rescue-attempter: this externality accounts for the $150,000
difference between the $50,000 ex ante profits the third rescue attempt should
have been predicted to yield and the $100,000 ex ante allocative-efficiency loss it
should have been predicted to generate. Similarly, the reason that the fourth
rescue attempt was ex ante profitable despite its allocative inefficiency-
namely, yielded ex ante profits of (20.25%)$1,000,000-$200,000=$2500 while
decreasing ex ante allocative efficiency by $140,000-is that the allocative cost
the fourth rescue attempt generated by reducing the probability that one of its
three predecessors would succeed by 14.25% from 75% to 60.75%=(3/4)(81%)
(the attendant reduction of $142,500 in the ex ante allocative benefits the first
three rescue attempts should have been predicted on the weighted average to
generate) was external to the fourth rescue-attempter: this externality accounts
for the $142,500 difference between the $2500 ex ante profits the fourth rescue
attempt should have been predicted to yield and the $140,000 ex ante allocative-
efficiency loss it should have been predicted to generate. I should perhaps note
that, in the situation described, any C at or above $615,384(8/13) but below
$800,000 would induce the allocatively efficient number of rescue attempts to be
made. Thus, any C in that range would induce at least two rescue attempts to be
made because a 32.5% chance of collecting at least $615,384(8/13) would be
worth at least $200,000 to a risk-neutral potential rescuer, and any C below
$800,000 will not induce three rescue attempts to be made because a 25%
chance of collecting less than $800,000 is worth less than $200,000-the cost of
the rescue attempt-to a risk-neutral potential rescuer (recall that if three
rescue attempts are made the probability that one of them will be successful is
75% so that each attempter will reckon with a 25% chance of being successful).
31. To demonstrate the relevance of these externalities, one need only alter
the example discussed in note 30 in two ways: (1) assume that there is a 10%
chance that the salvage involved in that case would not be lost if no one
attempted a rescue and (2) alter its second assumption to make the private and
allocative cost of each rescue attempt that could be made on the salvage in
question equal $350,000 rather than $200,000. On these assumptions, one
rescue attempt will be made if a successful salvor would receive the full market
value of what he had saved (and the potential rescuee had no opportunity to
reject the offer of a rescue attempt). This conclusion reflects the fact that, if one
rescue attempt were made, the weighted-average-expected award to the rescue-
attempter would be 40%($1,000,000)=$400,000, which exceeds the private cost
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(4) the imperfections in competition and various other
types of Pareto imperfections not yet considered (including
the possible difference between the value of salvage to its
owner and its market value) that would distort the private
(variable) cost of the rescue attempt or the market value of
the relevant salvage and hence (except fortuitously) the
profitability of the rescue attempt in an otherwise-Pareto-
perfect world if the C were set at the market value of the
rescued salvage.
Obviously, to induce sovereign, maximizing potential
marine-rescuers to make allocatively efficient decisions
about executing rescue attempts that would generate
environmental allocative benefits, one would have to offer
successful rescuers who had made attempts of this kind Cs
that exceed the market value of the salvage they rescued by
an appropriate amount, other things being equal. To induce
sovereign, maximizing potential marine-rescuers to make
allocatively efficient decisions about executing rescue
attempts that would generate the types of allocative
external costs discussed in items (2) and (3) in the preceding
list, one would have to offer successful rescuers who had
made attempts of this kind Cs that were appropriately
lower than the market value of the salvage they rescued,
other things being equal. To induce sovereign, maximizing
potential marine-rescuers to make allocatively efficient
decisions about executing rescue attempts whose
of that attempt ($350,000), while, if two rescue attempts were made, the award
that each rescue-attempter would expect to obtain on the weighted average-
(1/2)(65%)$1,000,000=$325,000-would be lower than the private cost of his
rescue attempt ($350,000). Unfortunately, on the assumptions of the current
example, the rescue attempt that would be made would be allocatively
inefficient-namely, would generate weighted-average-expected allocative
benefits of $300,000 by increasing the probability that the $1,000,000 of salvage
that was at risk would not be lost from 10% to 40% and allocative costs of
$350,000. The difference between the $50,000 in profits the rescue attempt in
question should be expected to generate ex ante and the $50,000 in allocative
inefficiency it should be expected to generate is the $100,000 in external costs it
would generate given the C on offer because there was a 10% probability that
the salvage in question would not have been lost had no attempt been made to
rescue it. Other things being equal, to prevent this type of misallocation, one
would have to reduce the C the court awarded by the weighted-average-expected
amount of salvage that would not have been lost had no attempt been made to
rescue it: in effect, such a reduction would internalize to the potential rescuer
what would otherwise be the external cost his rescue-attempt would impose on
the owner of the imperiled salvage.
CRITIQUE OF LANDES & POSNER
profitability would be distorted by other types of Pareto
imperfections than those already considered, one would
have to increase or decrease the Cs they would be awarded
above or below the market value of what they rescued to
offset the profit-distortions these other types of
imperfections would generate.
The fourth type of marine-loss-avoidance decisions are
background (fixed-cost) decisions to construct marine-
salvage ships, to alter or equip other sorts of ships to
increase their marine-salvage capabilities, to hire and train
personnel to perform marine-salvage functions, and to
deploy ships in positions that increase their marine-salvage
opportunities. Although one could investigate the C-formula
that would make it profitable for potential marine salvors to
make the set of fixed-cost decisions that would be most
allocatively efficient if all salvage ships that were
constructed, all non-salvage ships that were adapted to
increase their salvaging capabilities, and all relevant
personnel would be deployed and then used as allocatively
efficiently as is possible, the more relevant question is:
Which C-formula would produce the most-allocatively-
efficient set of potential-marine-rescuer background (fixed-
cost) decisions, given the way in which each possible set of
constructed or adapted salvors and their personnel would
actually be deployed and used? I will assume at the outset
that all marine salvors are identical professional salvors
and that the economy is otherwise-Pareto-perfect. The
consequences of relaxing these unrealistic assumptions will
be examined at the end of the relevant discussion.
I begin with two fairly obvious observations. First, the
C-formula that would prevent marine-salvor fixed-cost-
decision (background-decision) misallocation would have to
yield salvage awards that would give salvors enough
operating profits across all their rescue attempts to cover
the fixed costs they would incur if the most-allocatively-
efficient set of marine-rescue fixed-cost decisions were
made-that is, would have to exceed the product of (the
market value of the salvage they rescued) and (100%
divided by the ex ante probability that they would rescue
any salvage [if for expositional reasons we continue to make
the simplistic assumption that ex ante the potential rescuer
will believe that he has an X% chance of rescuing $Z in
salvage and no chance of rescuing any other amount of
salvage]). Second, the C-formula in question will not, in
general, be the formula that causes each salvor's weighted-
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average-expected salvage-awards to exceed his variable
rescue costs by the same percentage by which his fixed
rescue costs exceed his total variable rescue costs. If courts
awarded Cs that enabled all existing salvors to earn a
normal return on their fixed costs, those Cs (1) would
perpetuate excessive investment in marine-salvage
capabilities from the perspective of allocative efficiency if
too many resources were devoted to marine-salvage-
capabilities investment from that perspective prior to the
relevant awards being made and (2) would perpetuate
inadequate investment in marine-salvage capabilities from
the perspective of allocative efficiency if too few resources
were devoted to marine-salvage-capability investment from
that perspective prior to the relevant awards being made.
As these two observations imply, in order to determine
the percentage by which the total amount of awarded Cs
should exceed the total variable rescue costs the salvor
incurred, the analyst would have to know not the ratio of
existing-salvor fixed (background) costs to existing-salvor
total variable (foreground) costs but the ratio of marine-
salvor fixed to total variable cost that would prevail if the
set of marine-salvor fixed-cost decisions were made that
would be most allocatively efficient, given the way in which
the relevant salvage ships and personnel would actually be
used. Obviously, to determine this latter ratio, the analyst
would have to do a complete analysis of the way in which
the C-award that would eliminate marine-salvor fixed-cost-
decision misallocation would affect all other decisions that
would influence the allocative efficiency of any given set of
marine-salvor fixed-cost-decisions-that is, would influence
not only marine-salvor variable-cost (rescue-attempt)
decisions but also potential-rescuee marine-peril-avoidance
decisions and rescue-service-offer acceptance/rejection
decisions.
I hasten to note that these analyses will take account of
the unfortunate fact that the C-award formula that will
eliminate marine-salvage fixed-cost- decision (background-
decision) misallocation, given the other decisions it will
induce potential marine salvors and potential marine
rescuees to make, will almost certainly simultaneously
cause marine salvors to make allocatively inefficient rescue-
attempt (foreground) decisions and potential marine
rescuees to make allocatively inefficient marine-peril-
avoidance and rescue-service-offer acceptance/rejection
decisions. I hasten to note as well that, even on the
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simplifying assumptions on which the preceding discussion
was based, the second-best-allocative-efficiency analysis of
the C-award formula that would eliminate marine-salvor
fixed-cost-decision misallocation would be both extremely
complex and very difficult. 2
I will now relax the two simplifying assumptions made
at the beginning of this discussion. First, even when the set
of marine-salvor fixed-cost decisions is allocatively efficient,
the ratio of fixed to total variable cost of different marine
salvors will vary substantially. More specifically, the ratio
in question (1) will be highest for professional salvors, next
highest for semi-professional salvors, and lowest for casual
salvors33  and (2) may vary considerably within the
professional-salvor and semi-professional-salvor categories.
Obviously, this reality implies that the C-formula that will
eliminate marine-salvor fixed-cost-decision misallocation
will be more complicated than would otherwise be the
case-that is, it will have to reflect inter-salvor variations in
the relevant fixed-cost to total-variable-cost ratio. Second,
as noted in the discussion of the other types of marine-peril-
related misallocation that can be generated, the economy is
highly-Pareto-imperfect. Various Pareto imperfections will
affect the analysis of the C-formula that will eliminate
marine-salvor fixed-cost-decision misallocation in at least
two ways:
(1) by complicating the analysis of the marine-salvor
fixed-cost decisions that would be most allocatively efficient
and
(2) by making it necessary for the analyst of the C-
award formula that would eliminate all marine-salvor fixed-
cost-decision misallocation to take account of any
government subsidization of the relevant fixed-cost
32. Neither Landes & Posner nor the Harvard Note (which makes many
improvements on Landes & Posner) manifest any awareness of the complexity
and difficulty of the analysis one would have to execute to identify "the most-
allocatively-efficient set of fixed-cost marine-salvage decisions" in any sense in
which that concept might be defined. See Harvard Note, supra note 19, at 1907-
08; Landes & Posner, supra note 4.
33. I am assuming that, by definition, "casual salvors" are salvors who have
not adapted their ship, altered the selection or training of their ship's personnel,
or changed their ship's deployment in any way to increase the amount of salvage
they rescue. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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expenditures or any license fees the government charged
professional or semi-professional marine salvors.
The first of these two realities requires some
elaboration. Pareto imperfections will complicate the
analysis both of the total amount of fixed-cost expenditures
that will be allocatively efficient for marine salvors to make
and of the particular fixed-cost expenditures that will be
allocatively efficient for them to make, given the total
investment made in marine-salvage "capabilities." Pareto
imperfections will affect the total amount of fixed-cost
expenditures that will be allocatively efficient (1) by
distorting the private cost of the resources the fixed-cost
expenditures "consume," (2) by distorting the private
variable cost of rescue attempts, (3) by distorting the
private value to their owners of any salvage such fixed-cost
and variable-cost expenditures enable marine salvors to
rescue, (4) by externalizing from the marine salvor any
benefit his fixed-cost expenditures generate by causing him
to prevent environmental allocative losses, and (5) by
influencing the impact of his fixed-cost expenditures on the
amount of misallocation generated by marine-peril-related
decisions made by potential rescuees. Pareto imperfections
will affect the C-formula that will prevent marine salvors
from making less -allocatively-efficient fixed-cost
expenditures than they could have made given their total
investment in marine-salvage "capabilities" (1) because
Pareto imperfections may yield different distortions in the
private cost of different sorts of fixed-cost expenditures-in
particular, different distortions in the private cost of
constructing salvage ships, altering non-salvage ships,
equipping either sort of ship, hiring and training salvage-
operation personnel, and deploying salvage-capable ships in
particular ways-and (2) because (A) the type of fixed-cost
expenditure that is made may affect the type of salvage that
is rescued or the balance between salvage rescued and
environmental losses prevented and (B) the operative
Pareto imperfections may yield different distortions in the
private value to their owners of the different sorts of salvage
that different fixed-cost expenditures would cause to be
saved and/or in the private value to the salvor of preventing
environmental losses. For all these reasons, the C-formula
that will eliminate marine-salvor fixed-cost-decision
misallocation will have to take account of the nature of the
fixed-cost expenditures the salvor in question made or
should have made from the perspective of allocative
efficiency.
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I want to close this discussion by emphasizing two
points. First, the C-award formula whose application would
eliminate marine-salvor fixed-cost-decision misallocation
would focus not just on the expenditures of the successful
salvor in the case at hand and the operating profits the
award its use would produce in the instant case but on the
fixed-cost decisions of all marine salvors and potential
marine salvors, on the amount of such expenditures that
would be allocative efficient, and on the amount of salvage
each salvage-boat or salvage-adapted non-salvage boat
would rescue. Second, except fortuitously, the C-award
formula whose application would eliminate marine-salvor
fixed-cost-decision (background-decision) misallocation
would not eliminate marine-salvor variable-cost-of-rescue-
attempt-decision (foreground-decision) misallocation,
potential-rescue background- avoidance- decision
misallocation, or potential-rescuee rescue- service-offer
acceptance/rej ection- decision (foreground- decision)
misallocation.
The final type of marine-loss-avoidance decisions are
marine-loss-avoidance decisions by potential rescuees. With
two exceptions, the analysis of the C-award formula that
would eliminate the misallocation that this type of marine-
loss-avoidance decision can generate is identical to the
analysis of the C-award formula that would eliminate
potential-rescuee rescue-service-offer acceptance/rejection-
decision misallocation:
(1) the C-formula that would prevent potential-rescuee
avoidance-decision misallocation (if all potential rescuees
were sovereign maximizers) would have to take account of
the effect that such decisions have on the fixed allocative
costs that potential salvors generate as well as on the
amount of variable allocative costs rescue attempts
generate, the allocative value of salvage that is lost, and the
environmental allocative costs that marine peril generates,
and
(2) the C-formula that would prevent potential-rescuee
avoidance-decision misallocation (if all potential rescuees
were sovereign maximizers) would have to take account of
the distortion in the private cost of potential-rescuee
avoidance-moves that was generated by the operative
Pareto imperfections.
Hence, in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world in which




misallocation would equal the sum of (1) the product of (the
variable cost of the rescue attempts made) and (100%/[the
probability that these attempts would be successful]) and (2)
(the amount by which the potential rescuee's activities
increased the fixed-cost marine-salvage-related
expenditures of all marine salvors divided by the number of
times the rescuee was the object of a successful marine-
rescue attempt-that is, the number of times the rescuee
had to compensate a marine salvor). And, in our actual,
highly-Pareto-imperfect world, the C-formula that would
prevent sovereign, maximizing potential rescuees from
making misallocative marine-peril-avoidance decisions
would have to be adjusted to offset the distortion in the
profitability of such decisions that the operative Pareto
imperfections would generate by distorting the private cost
of the fixed-cost-of-rescuing and variable-cost-of-rescuing
expenditures the avoidance-move in question would deter,
the private value to the potential rescuee of the salvage
whose loss the avoidance-decisions in question would
prevent, the private value to the potential rescuee of the
environmental allocative losses the avoidance-decisions in
question would prevent, and the private cost of the
avoidance-decisions themselves to the potential rescuee in
question.
The same two conclusions that I have reached about all
the other types of marine-peril-related misallocation this
section has discussed will apply equally forcefully in
relation to potential-rescuee marine-peril-avoidance-
decision misallocation:
(1) the analysis of the C-formula that will prevent this
type of misallocation will be complicated and difficult, and
(2) the C-formula that will prevent this type of
misallocation will almost certainly not prevent the other
types of misallocation that may be associated with marine
perils.
I have so far discussed the various C-formulas that
would prevent each of the types of marine-peril-related
misallocation that judicially-ordered marine-rescuee-to-
rescuer compensation-awards could affect. As already
indicated, in order to identify the C-formula that would be
the most-allocatively-efficient formula a judicial system
could use, an analyst would also have to determine the
amount of marine-peril-related misallocation of each
relevant type that any given C-formula would generate
because it differed (if it did differ) from the formula that
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would eliminate misallocation of that type and, derivatively,
the total amount of marine-peril-related misallocation each
possible C-formula would generate.
For the former purpose, the analyst would have to (1)
calculate the aggregate distortion in the profitability of the
various decisions in each category that the different possible
C-formulae would generate, (2) ascertain the way in which
the relevant potential-marine-rescuer and potential-marine-
rescuee choices would be distorted by the relevant chooser's
non-sovereignty and non-maximization-inter alia, the
difference between these choosers' perception of the
profitability of the relevant choices and those choices' actual
profitability, and (3) determine the number of choices in
each category whose allocative efficiency was oppositely
signed to and absolutely smaller than the sum of the actual
distortion in the profitability of the relevant choices and the
''equivalent-dollar distortion" in their profitability that one
might say was caused by the relevant chooser's non-
sovereignty and non-maximization-that is, the number of
choices in each category whose profitability would be
critically distorted if the C-formula in question were used-
and the average allocative efficiency or allocative
inefficiency of those choices in the relevant category whose
profitability would be critically affected by the C-formula in
question.
I want to close this discussion of the approach to
marine-salvage awards that would be second-best
allocatively efficient for a judicial system to take with a
comment on one of its central findings-namely, that no
award will be able to eliminate all of the various types of
misallocation with which marine peril may be associated,
that the most-allocatively-efficient set of C-awards a judicial
system could make would not eliminate all marine-peril-
related misallocation. The comment is that this conclusion
exemplifies the following truism: in order to control X
decisions, a decision-maker must have X policy instruments.
A judicial system that is authorized solely to require marine
rescuees to compensate those of their rescuers who have not
negotiated a binding price for their services cannot
eliminate marine-peril-related misallocation by making
appropriate compensation awards because, regardless of
how complicated it makes the formula it uses to determine
those awards, the number of policy instruments at its
disposal will be smaller than the number of decisions it will
need to control to eliminate all marine-peril-related
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misallocation. Even on the second-best-allocative-efficiency-
analysis assumptions that perfect theoretical analyses can
be costlessly executed and perfect data can be costlessly
collected and analyzed, such compensation awards would
have to be supplemented with other policies such as marine-
salvor subsidies or license fees for misallocation to be
eliminated.
IV. THE APPROACH THAT WOULD BE THIRD-BEST
ALLOCATIVELY EFFICIENT FOR A JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO TAKE TO
MARINE-RESCUEE-TO-RESCUER COMPENSATION-AWARD
CASES
Third-best-allocative-efficiency analysis differs from
second-best-allocative-efficiency analysis in that it takes
account both of (1) the cost and probable imperfectness of all
conceptual analysis and (2) the cost and imperfectness of
data. Thus, someone who was trying to execute a third-best-
allocative-efficiency analysis would formulate and carry out
a theoretical analysis of a particular theoretical issue that a
second-best-allocative-efficiency analysis would perfectly
analyze if and only if he thought34 that the allocative cost of
his doing so was lower than the amount by which the
analysis in question would increase the allocative efficiency
of implementing the policy he would conclude would be best
to implement from the perspective of allocative efficiency.
Similarly, someone who was trying to execute a third-best-
allocative-efficiency analysis would collect and analyze data
or additional data on some parameter that his theoretical
analysis showed would affect the content of the most-
allocatively-efficient policy recommendation he could make
if and only if he thought that the allocative cost of the
34. I use the word "thought" to elide a conceptual problem that makes any
operationalization of the concept "third-best-allocative-efficiency analysis"
problematic-namely, the infinite-regress problem that arises in relation to the
following series of questions: How much time and effort should someone who
wants to execute a third-best-allocative-efficiency analysis devote to
determining whether he should try to formulate and think through a particular
theoretical issue (or collect some data)? How much time and effort should such
an individual devote to determining the time and effort he should devote to
determining the time and effort he should devote to determining the time and
effort he should devote to determining whether he should try to formulate and
think through a particular theoretical issue (or collect some data)? And so on
and so forth until the end of time.
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relevant data and its analysis was lower than the amount
by which that data would increase the allocative efficiency
of implementing the policy he would conclude would be best
to implement from the perspective of allocative efficiency. I
have four preliminary observations to make about some
determinants of the extent to which the analysis of some
issue that would be TBLE for a government decision-maker
to make would be less complicated than the analysis that
would be SBLE for him to execute, one point about a reason
why ceteris paribus TBLE analysis will be more complicated
than SBLE analysis, and four tentative suggestions about
the difference between the approaches to marine-rescuee-to-
rescuer compensation-award-formula determination that
would be second-best and third-best allocatively efficient for
a judicial system to adopt.
The four preliminary observations are all general-that
is, they apply to the concrete difference between second-best
and third-best allocative-efficiency analyses of all issues.
These observations are also all obvious. First, the extent to
which the TBLE analysis of any issue will be simpler than
the SBLE analysis of that issue will depend in part on the
general intellectual ability, specific skills, staff, procedures,
and budgets of the individuals and institutions that would
have to make the decision at which the analyses in question
would be directed. Second, these factors will be less
important if the decision-makers or decision-making
institutions in question can contract out the necessary
work-for example, if a court or judicial system can hire a
court master to execute the theoretical or empirical
analyses in question or can rely on data (say, on Pareto
imperfections) collected systematically by administrative
agencies. Third, although the factors listed in the first
preliminary observation will be less important when the
tasks in question can be contracted out, they will still have
some significance in such circumstances: decision-makers
and decision-making institutions will differ in their abilities
to hire "cost-effective" outside contractors, to monitor their
work, and to assess and implement their conclusions, and
such differences may affect the allocative efficiency of their
hiring outsiders at all and will often affect the character
and quantity of the theoretical and empirical analyses that
will be third-best allocatively efficient for decision-makers
to hire outsiders to execute. Fourth, the extent to which the
approach that will be TBLE for a given institution to take to
some policy-issue will be simpler than its SBLE counterpart
will depend in part on the extent to which it can take
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advantage of relevant theoretical work and empirical
analyses others have already completed. Most of the
theoretical analyses and data that a SBLE analysis of
marine-rescuee-to-rescuer compensation awards would
respectively execute and collect would also be relevant for
the analysis of the allocative efficiency of other policies-not
just of accident and pollution policies and finders and Good
Samaritan policies but also of antitrust, regulated-industry,
intellectual-property, and tax policies. A policy-making
system that relied on decision-makers to execute such
analyses and collect such data when it would be allocatively
efficient for them to do so if their efforts would not be
valuable to other decision-makers will be allocatively
inefficient (1) because the externalities that would be
generated in such a system would tend to cause each
individual decision-maker to do too little work of the
relevant kind and (2) because individual decision makers
and decision-making institutions might be unable to take
advantage of all available economies of scale in doing the
relevant theoretical and empirical work. I should say that,
at present, the governments of the United States
themselves do virtually no theoretical work on second-best
or third-best allocative-efficiency analysis and collect very
little data on Pareto imperfections. Nor do they provide
significant support for outsiders to do such theoretical and
empirical work. Instead of spending billions of dollars on
classifying industries and collecting market-aggregated
data that has virtually no policy significance,35 the United
States government should support theoretical work on
allocative-efficiency analysis and empirical work on Pareto
imperfections. If such work were done and its conclusions
made available to relevant decision-makers, TBLE analysis
would be much closer to SBLE analysis, and government
decision-makers would be more able to determine the policy
choices that would be allocatively efficient (and, I hope,
more able to make policy choices that are desirable in part
because they are more allocatively efficient).36
35. See Richard S. Markovits, On the Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market
Definitions, 47 ANTITRUST BuLL. 571, 600-01 (2002).
36. I do not deny the political impediments to public decisionmakers' making
desirable choices. Nor do I deny the reality that, from various legitimate value-
perspectives, the desirability of some or all policy choices will not be affected at
all by their allocative efficiency. On the latter point, see MARKOVITS, supra note
13, at 396-97; Markovits, supra note 3, at 36-40.
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I also want to make a specific point about a way in
which (against the run of general form) TBLE analyses will
be more complicated than SBLE analyses: TBLE analyses
will have to take account of theoretical and empirical
information-imperfections that will not trouble the SBLE
analyst. Thus, since the person who is executing a TBLE
analysis will have to recognize that his conclusion about the
identity of the policy option that is available to him or the
decision-maker who has hired him that is most allocatively
efficient may be wrong, he will have to identify the policy
that minimizes policy-error misallocation rather than the
policy he thinks is most likely to be allocatively efficient-in
the marine-salvage-award context, the person who is
executing a TBLE analysis will have to determine the C-
formula that will minimize C-award-error misallocation
rather than C-award errors (the difference between the
allocatively-efficient C-award and the actual C-award). If,
for example, a marine-salvage-award analyst has reason to
believe that awards that exceed the most-allocatively-
efficient award by a given amount are likely to be more
misallocative than awards that fall below that most-
allocatively-efficient sum by the same amount, it will be
TBLE for the analyst to recommend an award formula that
produces Cs that are on the high side. Obviously, the fact
that the information imperfections that TBLE analysis
takes into account make this additional calculation part of a
TBLE analysis implies that TBLE analysis will tend to be
more complicated on this account than SBLE analysis.
Finally, I have four observations to make about the
simplifications that would probably be TBLE for a judicial
system to make in the approach it takes to developing a C-
formula for marine-rescuee-to-rescuer compensation
awards. The first relates to the relevant theoretical
analysis: nothing about marine-salvage-compensation-
award analysis disposes me to depart from my general
(admittedly self-serving) conclusion that it will be
allocatively efficient to think through the relevant
theoretical issues as thoroughly as possible. The remaining
observations relate to the relevant empirical work. I should
admit at the outset that (1) my own lack of experience at
collecting data on the relevant Pareto imperfections and
various private cost and benefit figures that a SBLE
analysis would take into account, (2) the paucity of
independent private studies of these parameters from
whose execution I might be able to learn, and (3) the virtual
absence of government studies of these parameters all
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reduce my ability to say much of value about the specific
simplifications that would be TBLE for a judicial system to
make in the approach it takes to determining the formula
member-courts will use to calculate marine-rescuee-to-
rescuer salvage-awards (either if it could appoint a court
master to do the relevant work or if it could not contract out
this work in some such way).
The second is an admission against interest37 : I fear or
suspect that-given the characteristics of judges and
judicial organizations, the failure of government to execute
or sponsor the relevant theoretical and empirical analyses,
the failure of Economics Departments to train their
students to do second-best and third-best allocative-
efficiency analyses, and the paucity of economists who know
how or are inclined to execute such analyses-it may be
TBLE in the short to medium run for courts to ignore the
way in which imperfections in competition will distort the
private value of rescued salvage, the private fixed and
variable cost of marine-rescue attempts, and the private
cost of potential-marine-rescuee avoidance- moves.
The third is that it will probably be TBLE for a judicial
system that is trying to develop a TBLE marine-rescuee-to-
rescuer compensation award formula to ignore the
possibility that the affected marine salvors and rescuees
may make relevant human errors. In part, this conclusion
reflects the fact that those actors are (by and large)
sophisticated decision-makers. In part, it reflects the fact
that the relevant errors are hard to detect and may not be
biased in any particular direction. And in part, it reflects
the possibility that paying attention to particular errors
may give parties an incentive to make them.
My fourth suggestion is self-serving in the same sense
that my first such suggestion was a proposal against
interest. I suspect that it would be TBLE for a judicial
system to take account of virtually all of the other
complexities I have shown would be considered by a second-
best-allocative-efficiency analysis.
37. Because it undercuts the value of the theoretical work I have done on the
issue in question. See, e.g., supra note 23.
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V. SOME COMMENTS ON THE SENSE IN WHICH THE TBLE
MARINE-RESCUEE-TO -RESCUER COMPENSATION-AWARD
FORMULA IS ALLOCATIVELY EFFICIENT
This section makes three points about the allocative
efficiency of the TBLE formula for marine-rescuee-to-
rescuer compensation-awards. First, only fortuitously and
in practice, I expect, virtually or actually never will the
formula for marine-rescuee-to-rescuer compensation-awards
that is TBLE do the best job that any such formula could do
at reducing the amount of misallocation caused by the
marine-loss-avoidance choices made by potential marine
rescuers and rescuees. This conclusion reflects the fact that
the analysis that generated the formula in question was
TBLE-that the analyst stopped doing theoretical work and
collecting and processing data not at the point at which he
was certain that his formula recommendation would be
perfect but at the point at which he thought that the
allocative benefits that further work of the relevant kinds
would yield by enabling him to improve his formula
recommendation would be lower than its allocative cost.
Second, for reasons that the two preceding sections
should have made clear, even if one takes account of the fact
that the policy-package that would constitute the
government's TBLE response to marine peril would be
different from and, quite likely, less complex than the
policy-package that would constitute the government's
response to marine peril that would be SBLE, it is
extraordinarily unlikely that-standing alone-a policy of
creating common-law-type courts and instructing them to
require marine rescuees to pay successful marine rescuers
who have not been able to negotiate binding prices for their
services sums that are derived by applying the formula that
would be TBLE for such courts to employ for this purpose
would constitute the TBLE response the government could
make to marine peril.
Third, a policy of obligating such courts to order any
marine rescuee who has been sued by a salvor who has
rescued some or all of its salvage in circumstances in which
the salvor could not negotiate a binding price for his rescue
services might well be part of the TBLE response a
government could make to marine peril. A decision to create
such a cause of action would have at least the following five
advantages over such alternatives as the combination of
government-financed awards paid to successful marine
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salvors whose conduct increased allocative efficiency in
some sense and government civil or criminal penalties
levied on potential marine rescuees whose background-
marine-loss-avoidance-move rejections and marine-rescue-
offer rejections decreased allocative efficiency in some sense:
(1) it would provide marine rescuees with incentives to
supply government decision-makers with information about
the probability that their ship, cargo, passengers, and
officers would not have been lost had no one attempted a
rescue and various details about the rescue attempts that
were made on their salvage (for example, about the extent
to which they interfered with each other);
(2) it might save allocative transaction costs by
combining two proceedings into one;
(3) to the extent that the fines that would be collected
would be lower than the awards that would be given, it
would obviate the government's generating allocative
transaction costs and misallocation to finance the relevant
short-fall;
(4) it would reduce the misallocation and other bad
consequences that a government-run system of awards and
penalties would generate if those who administered it were
financially or politically corrupt; and
(5) (almost certainly least importantly) to the extent
that members of the public place a positive value on the
beneficiaries' of a marine rescue compensating their
rescuer, it will generate external-distributive-preference-
based external benefits on this account.
On the other hand, in comparison with such an
alternative approach, a decision to create such a cause of
action would have at least the following four disadvantages:
(1) it would sacrifice any skill and economies-of-scale-
related efficiencies that might be secured by creating a
specialized institution that concentrated on these issues and
heard all cases of the relevant kind;
(2) by relying on the successful salvor who was the
plaintiff in an individual case to provide information about
the rescuees' allocatively-inefficient marine-loss-avoidance-
decision conduct, it would misallocate resources not just
because the individual salvor might be less adept than a
government investigator at securing such information but
also because the private value of such information to the
individual plaintiff (the amount by which it would increase
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the award he received) would almost certainly be lower than
the allocative value of that information-the amount by
which the prospect of its discovery and use would increase
the allocative efficiency of the awards that are made;
(3) by relying on marine rescuees to counter the claims
their rescuer makes about his salvage-operation
investment, the variable cost of his rescue attempt, the ex
ante probability of its success, and the number of rescue
opportunities he has, it would misallocate resources not just
because the individual rescuee might be less adept at
securing such information than a government investigator
would be but also because the private benefit to a marine
rescuee of challenging his rescuer's claims on these issues
would be likely to be lower than the allocative value the
prospective provision of such information would generate by
affecting the allocative efficiency of the awards that are
made; and
(4) to the extent that the fines that would be collected
would exceed the awards that would be made, it would
reduce the misallocation the government would generate
when financing its expenditures (by reducing the
government's expenditures).
Although this set of observations about the allocative-
efficiency advantages and disadvantages of granting
successful marine salvors a legal right to secure
compensation from their rescuees is far too off-hand to
deserve much weight, I would not be surprised if a decision
to establish such a cause of action would be part of a TBLE
policy-package response to marine peril, at least if
jurisdiction for such cases were centralized or perhaps
assigned to a specialist court.
VI. THE THIRD-BEST ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY OF OUR
CURRENT JUDGE-ANNOUNCED-AND-APPLIED MARINE-
RESCUEE-TO-RESCUER- COMPENSATION LAW
This section examines whether our current judge-
announced positive marine-salvage law is third-best
allocatively efficient. Before proceeding to this task, I want
to make six preliminary observations. First, the discussion
that follows is not based on any assumption that the
internally correct way to resolve suits for compensation
brought against the owner of an imperiled ship by a
plaintiff who had tried to rescue that ship andlor the cargo,
passengers, and personnel it carried without being able to
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negotiate a binding price for the relevant rescue service
would be to apply a compensation formula whose derivation
and use would be third-best allocatively efficient.38
Second, the account of judge-announced marine-
rescuee-to-rescuer-compensation law on which this section
focuses is derived from the leading treatises on this
subject3": I have no expertise on the positive law of marine
salvage and no ability to assess whether the treatise
consensus I report is accurate.
Third, it is clear that the positive judge-announced law
of the United States on which this section focuses is
different in some respects from the positive judge-
announced marine-salvage law or actual "legal" practice of
other countries. For example, American courts seem to be
less willing than British courts to award compensation to
pure-life salvors-rescuers who save lives but no property-
and to place a lower value on lives saved than do their
British counterparts. 0 American and British courts also
38. For some accounts of why I do not think that in the United States the
internally-right answer to moral-rights-derived legal-rights questions (the kinds
of questions with which I think parts of constitutional law, all of the common
law, and non-statutory marine-salvage law are concerned) will not in general be
the answer that would be allocatively efficient, see generally Richard S.
Markovits, On the Economic Inefficiency of a Liberal-Corrective-Justice-Securing
Law of Torts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 525 (2006); Markovits, supra note 3, at 26-34,
44-47.
39. See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRICE, MARITIME LAW OF SALVAGE (1983); GRANT
GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 1975); 3A
MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SALVAGE (7th ed. 1997); and DAVID W. STEEL &
FRANCIS D. ROSE, KENNEDY'S LAW OF SALVAGE (5th ed. 1985).
40. "Historically, [in the United States,] the saving of life was regarded as
fulfilling a moral duty but not as entitling the salvor to a reward." GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 39, at 532. Since 1912, by statute, "[a] salvor of human life,
who gave aid following an accident giving rise to salvage, is entitled to a fair
share of the payment awarded to the salvor for salvaging the vessel or other
property or preventing or minimizing damage to the environment." 46 U.S.C. §
80107 (2006). At least one American court has held that this statute does not
entitle pure-life salvors to compensation if no property is rescued at the time
they saved the lives in question-for example, even if the imperiled ship sinks
and is raised subsequently. See In re St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co. (The
Eastland), 262 F. 535, 540-41 (N.D. Ill. 1919). Other American courts have
argued that life salvors are entitled to compensation only if they had to forego a
meaningful opportunity to rescue non-life salvage to save the lives they rescued.
See, e.g., Strachan Shipping Co. v. Cities Servs. Ref. Transp. Co. (The
Shreveport), 42 F.2d 524, 537-38 (E.D.S.C. 1930). In any event, even if the life
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seem to differ on the way to divide any compensation that is
awarded to marine salvors between owners of the salving
ship and its officers and crew." (Admiralty courts are
authorized not only to divide the compensation they award
among these three classes of possible recipients but also to
grant awards separately to individual officers and crew
members. However, in practice, admiralty courts rarely if
ever grant such individualized awards. Awards to
individual officers and crew members are almost always
made by the ship's owner or master.)
Fourth, the fact that many marine-salvor-compensation
cases are submitted to arbitration may not significantly
undercut the significance of judge-announced marine-
salvage law-in particular, if (as some observers claim)
"[a]rbitrators generally calculate salvage awards using the
same methods as do courts."42
Fifth, the greatly admired authors of at least one of the
canonical treatises on admiralty law appear to disagree
with the assumption this section makes that judicial
marine-rescuee-to-rescuer-compensation practice can be
salvor is held to be entitled to compensation under the statute, he is not entitled
to recover from those he has saved: his share must come out of the award made
against the property that has been salved. Moreover, in practice, life salvors
have received a surprisingly low percentage of the awarded compensation.
Although the few life-salvage cases on which the following assessment was
based may have been atypical in that the life salvors faced substantially less
danger and difficulty than the property salvors, one treatise concluded that "if
the few life salvage awards which have been made are enough to support a
generalization, it can be said that it is still far more profitable to save property
than to save lives." GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 39, at 573. British courts can
award compensation to pure-life salvors at the discretion of the Government,
and, in practice, seem to grant pure-life salvors awards more frequently than
their American counterparts and to place a higher value on lives saved than do
their American counterparts. See D. Rhidian Thomas, Life Salvage in Anglo
American Law, 10 J. MAR. L. & COM. 79, 90-91, 101 (1978); Harvard Note, supra
note 19, at 1897 n.10.
41. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 39, at 566, reports that in the "recent
American cases ... the ordinary division is two-thirds to the owner, one third to
the crew[,]" and cites a 1958 edition of Kennedy's treatise on civil salvage for the
proposition that the English courts were more favorable to the owners, a three-
fourths to one-fourth split being customary. Id. at 567 n.103 (citing KENNETH C.
McGUFFIE, KENNEDY'S CIVIL SALVAGE 235 (4th ed. 1958) [hereinafter KENNEDY]).
42. See Harvard Note, supra note 19, at 1897 n.8 (citing BRICE, supra note 39,
at 63).
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derived from the holdings and dicta of the canonical cases in
the field-indeed, manifest any consistency whatsoever.
Thus, Grant Gilmore and Charles Black have argued that
(1) "[n]o formula precise enough to be useful can be worked
out to indicate how large salvage awards will be in
particular cases,"43 (2) "[e]eventually the trial judge will pull
an arbitrary figure out of the air,"" and (3) "each award
continues to be a law unto itself.
45
Sixth, and finally, my decision to ignore Gilmore and
Black's skeptical conclusion and adopt the consensus
treatise-writer position (which Landes and Posner and the
author of the Harvard Note adopt) has the virtue of being a
decision against interest. The Gilmore and Black claim
clearly disfavors the hypothesis that judge-announced
marine-salvage law is allocatively efficient-a hypothesis
that I am seeking to disprove.
After commenting on the third-best allocative efficiency
of five components of "marine-peril law" other than the
approach the courts have taken to calculating the
compensation marine salvors are legally entitled to secure
from their rescuees, this section summarizes and assesses
the third-best allocative efficiency of the way in which most
treatises claim the courts calculate such marine-salvage
awards. Technically, the first component of marine-peril law
whose TBLE I want to discuss does not relate to the
compensation that successful marine salvors are entitled to
secure from rescuees when they have not negotiated a
binding price for their services. Rather, this component is
the law on "finders" of property that is classified as
"abandoned" rather than salvage.4 The American law that
relates to the general issue is complicated. Not only does it
vary from state to state, but in all states of which I am
aware it distinguishes among "mislaid property," "lost
property," and "abandoned property." "Mislaid property" is
43. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 39, at 564.
44. Id. at 563.
45. Id.
46. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4 at 105 ("[P]roperty is abandoned
where either (1) the owner has relinquished the property voluntarily because its
expected value to him has become zero or negative, or (2) the owner's identity
has become so obscure by passage of time or other circumstances that the costs
of ascertaining it would be prohibitive.").
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property that was intentionally placed somewhere by an
owner who subsequently forgot its location (or, possibly, its
existence). In part because the owner of mislaid property
may recall its existence and location, U.S. law tends to
award title to the owner over the finder. Indeed, courts have
held that the length of time the "find" was mislaid is
irrelevant to whether title belongs to the party that owned
the property before it was mislaid or the finder. More
recently, some states have adopted statutory regimes that
shorten the duration of the title that owners of mislaid
property have to that property to a period that gives them a
reasonable opportunity to reclaim the property.
"Lost property" is property that belonged to someone
who-through neglect, carelessness, or inadvertence-lost
control and possession of it and has no knowledge of its
whereabouts. Traditionally, U.S. law gave title of such
property to the finder if the finder did not know and had no
reasonable means of discovering the identity of the owner.
However, if the finder did know the identity of the pre-loss
owner or had a reasonable means of discovering his or her
identity, the finder's appropriation of the property would
make him guilty of larceny on the criminal side and
unlawful conversion on the civil side. More recently, some
jurisdictions have obligated finders of lost property to turn
it over to the police as part of a regime that assigns title of
the found object to the finder if it has not been reclaimed by
the pre-loss owner within a specified, reasonable period of
time.
"Abandoned property" is property that has been
discarded or voluntarily forsaken by its pre-abandonment
owner (perhaps because that party concluded that the cost
of repossessing it was greater than its value to him).
Owners of abandoned property know of the existence of the
property at the time of abandonment and usually know its
location as well. Pre-abandonment owners of property lose
title when they abandon the property, and, with one
important exception, finders of abandoned property obtain
title to it. The exception is "treasure trove," which escheats
to the state when found (though in many jurisdictions the
finder is entitled to some percentage of its market value).47
47. See BARLOW BURKE, PERSONAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 24-32 (3d ed.




Landes and Posner do not make any explicit
statement about the majority U.S. rule on "abandoned
property." All they say is that "the rule in England and in a
minority of U.S. states is that abandoned property escheats
to the state subject to a salvage claim by the finder."" For
current purposes, the relevant issue is not so much whether
they are right about the positive-U.S.-law issue but the
relative allocative efficiency of a rule assigning title to the
finder of found abandoned property and a rule assigning
title for all found abandoned property (not just treasure-
trove) to the State but entitling the finder to a certain
percentage of its market value. In broad terms, the rule
assigning title to the finder will be more allocatively
efficient if the following total is positive: (1) the allocative
benefits the rule generates (A) by obviating the State's
expending resources to identify instances in which
abandoned property has been found, to prove that
abandoned property has been found, to take possession of
the found abandoned property, to determine the reward to
which the finder is entitled, and to devise the financing of
the preceding activities and (B) by obviating the finders'
expending resources to conceal their finds and to participate
in the proceedings that the alternative rule in question
would entail minus (2) the allocative cost the rule generates
because (A) the alternative rule in question would generate
a fiscal gain for the State in that the private transaction
cost it would have to incur to engage in the activities listed
in (1)(A) above are lower than the difference between the
private value to the State of the found goods the State
would obtain under the alternative rule and the payments it
would make to finders under the alternative rule and (B) (if
I assume for simplicity that the rule adopted would not
affect other government expenditures or the government's
fiscal deficit) the alternative choices the State would make
to offset the associated fiscal loss will be allocatively costly
in that they will generate allocative transaction costs and
cause misallocation by distorting the incentives of affected
taxpayers and government-service/product buyers plus (3)
the allocative-efficiency gains that the rule in question
would generate relative to the specified alternative (if I
assume that the rule-choice will not affect the resources the
government devotes to finding abandoned property) by
48. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 106.
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providing potential salvors with additional incentives to
make background and/or foreground abandoned-property-
search expenditures (though it is conceivable that the rule
will cause allocative inefficiency by increasing such
potential-finder expenditures since no potential finder will
take account of the fact that its additional expenditures will
reduce the amount of abandoned property that other
potential finders will be able to "find" by making given
relevant expenditures and since other Pareto imperfections
may deflate the private cost of attempting to find
abandoned property).
The second issue of this type I want to discuss is the
third-best allocative efficiency of the legal rule that those
who attempt marine rescues have a legal entitlement to
compensation from the potential rescuees whose lives or
property they tried to rescue only if their rescue attempt
was successful. Landes and Posner argue that this rule
seems likely to be third-best allocatively efficient for two
reasons. First, because even when one takes into
consideration the tendency of this rule to generate allocative
transaction costs by making it necessary to adjudicate
whether a particular rescue attempt was successful, the
rule will tend to reduce the allocative transaction costs
generated by litigation (by reducing the number of claims
that are brought).49 Second, because the rule will also tend
to increase allocative efficiency by increasing the effort
salvors make and the skill they manifest when devoting
time to a rescue attempt ° In fact, the "no cure/no pay" rule
will also tend to increase allocative efficiency in a third way:
given that (1) (even with the information that potential
rescuees will provide) triers-of-fact will often not be able to
identify those unsuccessful rescue attempts that were ex
ante allocatively inefficient and (2) the awards that would
be TBLE for courts to make to those who made unsuccessful
marine-rescue attempts (if they did grant awards to such
49. Id. at 104 & n.46.
50. Id. at 104. Landes and Posner's articulation of this point is poor: "If
payment were not conditional on success, the rescuer would have a greater
incentive to reduce his effort and energy for a given quantity of rescue inputs."
Id. This formulation is deficient because, from the perspective of allocative
efficiency, the amount of inputs a salvor devotes to a rescue attempt (the
allocative cost of that attempt) depends not just on the number of man hours
devoted to the attempt and the identity of the rescue attempters but also on how
hard they work at executing the rescue attempt.
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parties) would more than cover the variable cost of their
unsuccessful rescue attempt, the relevant legal rule will
tend to increase allocative efficiency by deterring salvors
from making rescue attempts that were ex ante allocatively
inefficient. All things considered, then, I suspect that the
"no-cure/no-pay rule" is third-best allocatively efficient.5
51. The Harvard Note makes three counterarguments to this conclusion that
I do not think can bear scrutiny. First, it argues that the relevant rule increases
the allocative transaction costs that marine-peril-related litigation generates by
making it necessary for triers-of-fact in successful-rescue cases of this kind to
calculate what it refers to as "the risk premium" that must be paid to salvors "to
compensate salvors fully for attempts that came to naught." Harvard Note,
supra note 19, at 1912. However, regardless of whether rewards are made only
to successful salvors or to all actors who made marine-rescue attempts, the
TBLE compensation-award formula would require relevant triers-of-fact to
make such determinations-to discover, inter alia, the total amount of variable
and fixed rescue-attempt costs that were incurred by the members of the actual
set of operating salvors and would be incurred by the members of the
allocatively efficient set of operating salvors as well as the amount of salvage
these two sets of salvors would rescue and the environmental allocative losses
these two sets of salvors would prevent or cause. Second, the Harvard Note
argues that the rule in question may misallocate resources by inducing potential
marine rescuers to make rescue attempts that are ex ante allocatively inefficient
by inflating the private benefits of acts that increase the probability that they
will be successful. Id. In fact, although marine-salvage law may produce this
effect, the component of the law that will do so is not the no-cure/no-pay rule but
rather the fact that the ex ante weighted-average-expected or certainty-
equivalent value of the actual and TBLE compensation award is higher than the
variable cost of any rescue attempt that is made. Third, the Harvard Note
argues that the no-cure/no-pay rule tends to decrease allocative efficiency by
deflating the ex ante profitability of rescue attempts to casual salvors. Id. at
1912-13. In fact, although the rule does tend to deter risk-averse salvors of any
type from making rescue attempts by increasing the risk costs any such attempt
would impose on them and may on this account deter casual salvors more than
professional and semi-professional salvors (who have a larger portfolio of rescue
attempts and, therefore, have to incur lower risk costs to attempt any given
rescue), that fact does not imply that the rule will misallocate resources on this
account: risk costs are allocative costs and, ceteris paribus, if their presence
critically affects the profitability of a rescue attempt, it will critically affect the
allocative efficiency of that rescue attempt. Of course, ceteris paribus, the no-
cure/no-pay rule may misallocate resources by increasing the sum of the risk
costs borne by all parties it affects. However, there is no reason to assume that
the rule will have such an effect: although it will increase the risk costs that
rescue-attempters bear, it will simultaneously decrease the risk costs that
potential rescuees bear (by eliminating the possibility that they will not only
have to bear the marine loss that eventuated but also have to compensate
rescue-attempters whose rescue efforts failed).
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The third non-C-formula component of marine-peril law
whose allocative efficiency should be discussed is the law's
failure to impose a duty on potential rescuers in any
category to make rescue attempts they should have
perceived to be ex ante allocatively efficient. I will first
analyze the third-best allocative efficiency of imposing a
duty to make all rescue attempts that the potential rescuer
should have perceived to be ex ante allocatively efficient
that is not combined with any program for rewarding those
who make the rescue-attempts-for example, with any
program of direct government awards, with any admiralty-
law rule entitling marine rescuers to secure compensation
from the rescuees, or with any law-of-restitution rule
entitling marine rescuers to secure compensation in "unjust
enrichment" suits or in quantum meruit. In such a world,
the imposition of such a duty to rescue would tend to
increase allocative efficiency by decreasing the
misallocation that potential rescuers generate by failing to
make rescue attempts that they were in position to execute
and that they should have perceived to be ex ante
allocatively efficient, but would misallocate resources or
generate allocative costs (1) by deterring allocatively
efficient investments in marine-salvage capacity by
deflating the profits that the actors on whom this duty
might fall could earn by putting themselves in a position to
effectuate allocatively efficient rescues (by investing in
salvage ships, salvage equipment, salvage personnel,
salvage-personnel training, and salvage-deployment); (2) by
deflating the profitability to potential rescuees of the
various types of marine-loss-avoidance moves they could
make; (3) possibly by inducing potential rescuers to make
rescue attempts that were ex ante allocatively inefficient
when the product of (the probability that they would
mistakenly be found liable for not making the attempt in
question) and (the penalty that would be imposed on them if
they were found guilty or liable for failing to make the
attempt in question) was higher than the private cost to
them of making the relevant rescue attempt; and (4) by
generating various implementation allocative transaction
costs and implementation-financing allocative costs.
Although, therefore, one cannot determine the
allocative efficiency of imposing a duty to rescue in the
absence of any provision for rewarding those who make
allocatively efficient rescue attempts, I would guess that in
such a legal environment it would be allocatively efficient to
impose such a duty. However, that conclusion (1) depends
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on certain pessimistic assumptions about a potential
salvor's willingness to make rescue attempts that would not
be profitable, (2) would be strengthened if, by performing an
expressive function, the imposition of such a duty would
increase the inclination of our society's members and
participants to serve as Good Samaritans when it would be
allocatively efficient for them to do so, (3) would be
strongest when the potential rescuer was a casual salvor,
intermediately strong when he was a semi-professional
salvor, and weakest when he was a professional salvor since
the marine-salvage-investment-decision misallocation that
would be generated by the imposition of such a duty with no
provision for compensation would be greatest when the
potential rescuer was a professional marine salvor, etc.
Indeed, for this reason, absent a provision for compensation,
it might be third-best allocatively efficient to impose such a
duty only on casual potential salvors or only on casual and
semi-professional potential salvors.
Of course, in our actual world, a decision to impose a
duty to make ex ante allocatively efficient rescue attempts
on actors who should know that they are in a position to
make such rescue attempts will be made in a legal
environment in which successful marine salvors in the
relevant category will normally be legally entitled to obtain
compensation from the owners of the property and lives
they rescued. In this legal environment, the imposition of
such a duty to rescue should not cause salvage-operation-
investment-decision- misallocation or potential-rescuee
avoidance-decision misallocation. Admittedly, in such a
legal environment, the imposition of such a duty to rescue
might cause misallocation by inducing potential salvors who
fear that triers-of-fact may incorrectly find that a rescue-
attempt option that they reject was allocatively efficient to
make allocatively inefficient rescue attempts-in particular,
it will do so if the combination of the award for making a
successful rescue attempt and the penalty for failing to
attempt the rescue in question critically inflate the
profitability of making the rescue attempt. However, I
suspect that, in such a legal environment, the imposition of
such a duty to rescue might well tend to increase allocative
efficiency more by increasing the profitability of making
allocatively efficient rescue attempts that admiralty law
and practice would not otherwise have rendered profitable
and by increasing the inclination of potential salvors to
make such rescue attempts even when they would not be
profitable than it would decrease allocative efficiency by
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inducing potential salvors to make allocatively inefficient
rescue attempts, by generating the allocative transaction
costs of processing the State's civil and criminal claims
against potential salvors who rejected rescue opportunities,
and by generating the allocative transaction costs and other
sorts of allocative losses of financing the associated duty-
creation and duty-enforcement activities.
The fourth non-C-formula component of marine-salvage
law whose allocative efficiency should be discussed is the set
of rules for dividing salvage awards (1) between the owners
of the salving ship on the one hand and her personnel
(master, officers, and ordinary seamen) on the other and (2)
among the individual officers and crew. At least five points
or sets of related points are worth noting in this context.
First, the salvage award division could affect at least
three sets of marine-peril-related decisions and three
related types of marine-peril-related misallocation: (1)
decisions about whether to make a rescue attempt and
associated attempt/no-attempt misallocation, (2) decisions
about the attributes of any rescue attempt actually made
and the misallocation generated by such choices, and (3)
salvage-operation-investment decisions and misallocation.
Second, some of the effects of court-ordered award-
divisions on the various types of choices and misallocations
just listed will be substantially reduced by the impact that
such divisions have on the conventional-wage terms to
which the owner of the salvage ship and the ship's
personnel (the officers and ordinary seamen who work on
his ship) agree. Ceteris paribus, if potential salvors and
their employees believe that the employees or some subset
of the employees will be given $X in salvage awards, the
conventional wages paid to the salvor's employees or the
relevant subset of those employees will be reduced by $X-
that is, ceteris paribus, the fact that salvor crews are given
salvage awards will not affect their total wage package,
which will be determined by the supply of and demand for
the type of labor they can perform. Of course, the relevant
ceteris are not all paribus. Thus, court-ordered award-
divisions will affect the total-wage-related risk costs that
salvage-operation investors and the crews of ships that
attempt marine rescues bear (an allocative-efficiency effect).
Moreover, because the fact that court-ordered salvage-
award divisions will affect other employment-contract terms
will not eliminate their impact on the immediate rescue-
related incentives of decisions of ship owners, officers, and
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crews (because the effect such court decisions have on the
short-run profits these parties can earn by making
particular rescue-attempt decisions will not be completely
offset by related changes in their future labor contracts),
court-ordered salvage-award divisions will affect (1) the
nature of the rescue attempts that are made (both a
positive-economic and an economic-efficiency effect) by
altering the incentives that crew members have to work
harder and more skillfully when attempting marine rescues
and to risk injury or death when making such attempts and,
relatedly, both (2) the number of rescue attempts that given
ships are used to execute and (3) the total amount of
marine-salvage-operation investments that are made by
altering the profits that a ship owner can earn by using his
ship to rescue some or all of a given body of salvage (two
positive-economic effects that have allocative-efficiency
consequences).
The third set of comments I want to make on the
admiralty courts' award-division practices relate to their
impact on rescue-attempt/no-rescue-attempt decisions and
misallocation. Assuming that (1) admiralty-law award
divisions override any division specified in the labor
contract between the salvage-ship owner and his
employees52 or that the applicable employment contracts do
52. I have not been able to ascertain whether admiralty courts are willing to
override the division of a salvage award that is specified in an employment
contract or collective-bargaining agreement between the owner of a salvage ship
and its officers and crew. I have found no case directly on point, and the
information I have gleaned from experts and from treatises favor different
conclusions. See supra note 39. On the one hand, labor-law experts assume that
admiralty courts would not be willing to override employment contracts or a
fortiori collective-bargaining agreements because those agreements when made
are supposed to comprehensively control employer-employee relations. This
position is supported by the fact that, with the exception of one jurisdiction,
American jurisdictions have consistently held that collective-bargaining
agreement "maintenance and cure" (accommodation and medical-care)
provisions trump the admirality court's decision when the injured crew member
can show that the actual hospital and medical fees he has to pay exceed the per
diem sums specified in the collective-bargaining agreement. For the majority
American position, see, for example, Baldassaro v. United States, 64 F.3d 206,
212-13 (5th Cir. 1995). But see Barnes v. Andover Co., 900 F.2d 630, 644 (3d Cir.
1990) (basing award of maintenance on costs actually incurred). On the other
hand, (1) wages-and-hours legislation and safety legislation does sometimes
override the terms of collective-bargaining agreements, (2) admiralty-law
experts tell me that the disposition of admiralty-court judges to secure the
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not cover this issue, (2) the decision to make a rescue
attempt is made by the ship owner or by someone whose
choice is determined by the ship owner's interest, (3) the
value the court attributes to salved property and lives
equals their allocative value, (4) the rescue attempt either
will not affect the allocative environmental losses the
marine peril generates or, if it does, the total award reflects
any related allocative benefits the rescue attempt generates
and the ship owner is liable for any environmental losses
the rescue attempt generates and his liability is not
externalized through insurance coverage or bankruptcy
options, and (5) the private variable cost of the rescue
attempt equals its allocative counterpart, the law-specified
division between owners and crew will eliminate
attempt/no-attempt misallocation if the share of the award
the law gives to the ship owner equals his share of the total
private variable cost of the rescue attempt 3 to him and his
interests of seamen, see GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 39, at 567, would incline
them to conclude that judicial awards that exceed the sum to which their
employment contract would entitle them can override the employment contract,
and (3) 46 U.S.C. §10317 (2006) ("[A] stipulation by which a seaman consents to
abandon a right to wages if the vessel is lost, or to abandon a right the seaman
may have or obtain in the nature of salvage, is void") entitles the crew to an
award that exceeds the amount specified in their employment contract or the
sum they agree to accept post-rescue. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 39, at
567.
53. The ship owner's share of these costs will depend on the percentage of
these costs constituted by (1) the weighted-average ship-and-equipment costs
the rescue attempt should be expected to generate (by wearing out these assets,
by damaging them, or by causing them to be lost), (2) the opportunity cost of
diverting these assets to the rescue attempt in question (the alternative
activities [including speedier delivery] in which the ship could have engaged had
it not been used to execute the rescue attempt) that the ship owner would bear
because the rescue attempt prevented him from supplying the towing services
his ship could otherwise have supplied or because he was obligated to
compensate the owners of the cargo he was carrying and his passengers for the
costs any related delay in their arrival at their destination imposed on them
(and he was not insured for this contingency) or would lose profits in the future
because the delays that resulted from the rescue attempt damaged his
reputation for reliability, (3) the weighted-average costs the rescue attempt
should be expected to generate by causing cargo (passengers) to be damaged
(injured or inconvenienced) or lost (killed)-costs for which he was liable and not
insured or judgment-proof (or whose generation would cost him future profits
by damaging his reputation), and (4) the weighted-average-expected costs the
rescue attempt would impose on his ship's officers and crew by making their
labor more costly to them (injury and death aside) or by injuring and killing
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ship's crew. Of course, if the preceding conditions are not
fulfilled, the conclusion in question will not be correct
(unless the various departures from the conditions in
question fortuitously cancel each other out in relation to
this issue). Thus, if (1) the total salvage award is lower than
the allocative value of the property and lives saved and
environmental damages prevented and/or (2) the private
total variable cost of the rescue attempt is higher than its
allocative counterpart (with the relevant percentage
distortion being the same for the private variable costs
incurred by the ship owner and the ship's crew), the share of
the award that the ship owner will have to be given for the
profitability of the rescue attempt to him to be undistorted
will be higher than the share he would bear of the total
private variable cost of the rescue attempt. In the other
direction, if (1) the total salvage award is higher than the
allocative value of the property and lives saved and
environmental allocative losses prevented54 and/or (2) the
private variable cost of the rescue to the ship owner is lower
than its allocative counterpart, the share of the award the
ship owner will have to be given for the profitability of the
rescue attempt to him to be undistorted will be lower than
the share he would bear of the total private variable cost of
the rescue attempt.
According to Gilmore and Black, in the United States,
the ordinary admiralty-law division between ship owner
and crew circa 1975 was two-thirds to the ship owner and
one-third to the ship's crew.5 According to Kennedy's Civil
them to the extent that he was liable for these costs and not insured or
judgment-proof for them or to the extent that the generation of these costs
would increase his future costs by raising the wages he had to pay personnel or
the insurance premiums he had to pay.
54. Since the private value of property to its owners may exceed its allocative
value, the possibility that the award is higher than the allocative value of the
property and lives saved and environmental allocation losses prevented is not
ruled out by the admiralty-law rule that salvage awards for rescued property
cannot exceed the value of the property to its owner(s). See GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 39, at 563 (arguing that the award can never be greater than the
value of the salved property).
55. Id. at 566. Colleagues who are experts in admiralty law and practice have
told me that, in their view, these numbers also reflect current judicial practice.
Gilmore and Black indicate that "[i]f a few salvage arbitrations reported in
American Maritime Cases are representative, the arbitrators appear to give a
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Salvage, which Gilmore and Black cite on this point,
"'ordinary apportionment' in England, since late in the 19th
century, has been three-fourths to the owner and one-fourth
to the officers and crew."56
I simply do not have the data needed to determine
whether either of these divisions would eliminate rescue-
attempt/no-rescue-attempt-decision misallocation. Since
there is no reason to believe that the relevant facts differ
appropriately in the two countries, it is less likely that both
countries' award-division practices eliminate such
misallocation than that either country's practices do so.
The fourth set of comments I wish to make about the
admiralty courts' award-division practices relate to their
impact on rescue-attempt-quality decisions and
misallocation. Assuming that (1) the admiralty-law division
of the total salvage-award controls, (2) the private cost to
individual salvage-ship crew members of working harder,
working more carefully or skillfully, or taking a greater risk
of being injured or killed equals its allocative counterpart,
and (3) the relevant individual officers and ordinary seamen
would not have to pay any taxes on the awards they
received, the division of the award between ship owners and
personnel and among personnel will induce the salvage-
ship's individual officers and ordinary seamen to make
allocatively efficient decisions as to how hard and skillfully
to work and to what risks to take when carrying out a
rescue attempt if they result not only in the total award to
the ship's crew's increasing dollar for dollar with their
allocative product but also in each individual actor's award's
increasing dollar for dollar with the amount by which his
efforts increased the allocative value of the property and
lives that were saved and the environmental damage
prevented. Unfortunately, from the perspective of this
section's organization, this conclusion implies that I cannot
discuss the impact of the division of the award on the
allocative efficiency of the ship's personnel's laboring
decisions without taking account of the size of the total
award made to the ship's owner and crew combined, since
that total will affect the total award received by all crew
members combined and by each individual officer and
larger proportion of the award to the owners than do the courts." Id. at 566
n.102.
56. Id. at 567 & n.103.
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ordinary seaman. In any event, the preceding conclusion
implies that, to the extent that the private cost to each
relevant crew member of being injured or killed is lower
than the allocative cost (because [1] he does not fully
internalize the non-material loss his friends and family
suffer when he is injured or killed, [2] the associated
medical expenses are subsidized by insurance payments or
government transfers, [3] the non-wage costs of his being
disabled are partially offset by private and government
disability insurance, unemployment insurance, and welfare
transfers, and [4] the wage cost of his being disabled or
killed is deflated by the taxes he would have paid on the
gross income he lost57  and/or various other Pareto
imperfections that caused his gross wage to be lower than
his allocative product), the award that a crew member must
expect to be given for his effort and risk-taking incentives to
be undistorted will increase with his effort and risk-taking
by less than his extra effort and risk-taking increase his
contribution to the allocative value of the property and lives
saved and environmental damage prevented. The preceding
analysis also implies that, to the extent that the private cost
to the actor of being injured or killed is higher than the
allocative cost (because the relevant Pareto imperfections
inflate the wages his injury or death prevent him from
earning), and, to the extent that taxes reduce the after-tax
award he receives below the gross sum he is awarded, the
gross award the relevant individual officers and ordinary
seamen would have to anticipate securing for their effort
and risk-taking incentives to be undistorted would have to
increase with increases in their efforts and risk-taking by
more than such increased efforts and risk-taking increased
the allocative benefits their rescue-attempt labor generated.
This discussion should provide a basis for assessing the
impact of the way in which marine-salvage law divides the
total compensation it awards between salvage-ship owners
and crew and among salvage-ship crew members on the
amount of misallocation salvage-ship officers and ordinary
57. Such awards are treated as ordinary earned income. It appears that some
salvor officers and crew members engage in tax fraud by setting up foreign
corporations for which they nominally work and arranging for any salvage
awards they secure to be paid to those corporations. I have no empirical
information about the extent to which salvage-ship personnel engage in such
behavior or the likelihood that they would believe at the time of the rescue
attempt that their efforts to escape taxation in this way would be successful.
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seamen generate because of the way in which they design or
execute rescue attempts. Because admiralty-law experts
have told me that Gilmore and Black's account of the
relevant positive law was very accurate when written in
1975 and has become more accurate as courts have self-
consciously chosen to conform their decisions to Gilmore
and Black's account of judicial practice, I will assume that
Gilmore and Black's description of the living law is correct.
Three aspects of Gilmore and Black's description of the
courts' award-practices are relevant in the current context.
First, Gilmore and Black state that the total award made to
a salving ship's owner and crew combined is directly related
to the value of the property and lives saved, the promptness
of the rescue attempt, and the skill and bravery that the
rescue personnel showed but is inversely related to the
damage the rescue attempt caused negligently and the
amount by which the rescue attempt reduced the (private)
cost-effectiveness of the rescue attempts of others by
unnecessarily interfering with them.58 Although from the
perspective of allocative efficiency this practice involves a
kind of double-counting (in that speed, skill, and bravery
increase the award both directly and indirectly by
increasing the value of property and lives saved), it does
suggest that the total awards to ship owner and crew
combined, hence, the award to the ship's crew as a group,
and, hence, the award to individual ship officers and
ordinary seamen do vary in the allocatively efficient
direction with the allocative efficiency of each individual
crew member's conduct. Two additional points are relevant
at this juncture. First, the preceding account provides no
basis for concluding that-even if it would be accurate to
assume that individual crew members would make the
laboring choices that would maximize the equivalent-dollar
interest of the owner and crew of the ship combined-the
quantitative relationship between the total sum awarded
and the allocative product of the choices the ship's crew
made would eliminate any distortion in each individual
crew member's work incentives. Second, bravery and
courage and, hence, rewarding bravery and courage may be
more allocatively efficient than one might suppose.
Although in our society potential rescuers do not have a
moral (or legal) obligation to make choices that would
58. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 39, at 554-62.
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subject them to a significant risk of death or substantial
bodily injury, that fact does not reflect a judgment that
choices to incur such risks would be allocatively inefficient.
Bravery is often allocatively efficient: the ex-ante allocative
cost of a potential rescuer's attempting a rescue that
exposes him or her to a significant risk of substantial bodily
harm or death may be lower than the allocative benefits of
the rescue attempt if the attempt is sufficiently likely to
save the lives of many people. Moreover, to the extent that
that the private cost of bravery is deflated less by private
insurance and government transfers than the private value
of any awards paid for bravery is deflated by taxation, it
may be allocatively efficient to make the award given for
brave conduct exceed that conduct's allocative product.
The second component of Gilmore and Black's account
of salvage-award practice that is relevant in the current
context is their more refined description of the factors that
influence the percentage of the total award made to the
owner and crew of a ship making a successful marine-rescue
attempt that is allocated to the crew:
In high order salvage, where the individual salvors, under
dangerous conditions, show skill, resourcefulness and courage, the
crew's share will be upped. In low order salvage, which is just
enough more than simple towage to qualify at all and where the
crew has done little, the owner will get a larger than usual
share.
59
Once more, this implies that admiralty-law practice will
tend to decrease rescue-attempt-quality misallocation by
making the awards to individual actors increase with the
allocative product of their conduct. Obviously, unless the
awards are properly individuated, an individual's choice
that would increase his allocative product by $X would not
increase his individual award by $X even if it would
increase by $X the award his ship's officers and ordinary
seamen combined obtained.6"
59. Id. at 566.
60. Admittedly, the tendency of any such disparity to cause misallocative
laboring choices to be made will be smaller to the extent that (1) individual
officers and crew members are motivated by the equivalent-dollar interest of the
ship personnel group as a whole and/or (2) the decision of a given officer or crew
member to act allocatively efficiently encourages other ship personnel to make
[Vol. 59116
CRITIQUE OF LANDES & POSNER
The third component of Gilmore and Black's account of
salvage-award practice that is relevant in the current
context relates to the individuation of salvor-crew awards. I
will initially assume that all award-individuation is done by
the courts. (In fact, as I have already indicated, although
the courts are authorized to allocate the award not only
among salvage-ship owners, officers, and seaman but to
individual officers and individual seamen, they rarely grant
individual awards.) I will then discuss the significance of
the fact reported to me by experts that ship owners and ship
masters often control the awards that their ship's individual
officers and individual ordinary seamen receive.
Gilmore and Black offer the following description of
admiralty-court award-individuation:
"Basic" awards to the crew are usually made according to rank or
monthly pay; the master and senior officers receive substantially
more than ordinary seamen. These awards are made to all crew
members of the salving ship, whether or not they personally took
part in the rescue work. Additional awards are then frequently
made to individuals who played conspicuous roles: to those who
boarded a derelict ship, helped to extinguish fires, or navigated
her to port. Ingenuity as well as personal bravery may justify an
additional award, as in the case of an officer, who by noticing that,
contrary to the charts, tides were higher at night than during the
day, contributed the idea that made it possible to refloat a
stranded ship after several daytime attempts had failed.6'
I have three comments to make about the impact of
such an individuation scheme on rescue-attempt-quality
misallocation. First, if the total award to the crew equaled
the crew's allocative product, the practice of giving non-
participants the "basic" award would be misallocative even
if across all of a ship's rescues the practice had no impact on
individual crew members' compensation-shares. At least,
this conclusion will be justified unless each choice by each
individual crew member was motivated by a desire to
maximize the equivalent-dollar gain to the crew as a whole
rather than to the individual crew member. Second, if
contrary to my expectation, the differences in the basic
salvage awards that the individual members of different
allocatively-efficient choices (that would not be individually profitable for them
but for their tendency to encourage others to make such choices).
61. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 39, at 567.
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categories of salvage-ship crew receive do affect their
relative total compensation, I would be unable to judge
whether the practice of giving substantially higher "basic"
awards to individual officers than to individual seamen
would be allocatively efficient-that is, would induce ship
owners to hire an allocatively efficient combination of
officers and ordinary seamen. More specifically, on the
above assumption, this practice would be allocatively
efficient if and only if the basic award difference was the
difference in the ordinary allocative products of individual
workers in the two categories. However, if, as I suspect,
differences in the weighted-average amounts of salvage
awards that a ship's average officer and average seamen
will expect to obtain do not affect differences in their total
weighted- average-expected wage-packages, this component
of the courts' award-division practice will affect allocative
efficiency only by changing the amount of "total-wage-
package" risk costs the ship's crew members bear. Third,
the reported "additional award" practices of the courts all
individuate individual crew members' awards in the
direction that would be allocatively efficient, though I do not
have the data necessary to assess whether the magnitude of
the individual "additional awards" given are allocatively
efficient.
I now want to make four comments on the likely
allocative efficiency of any award-individuation executed by
salvage-ship masters or captains. First, if, as I expect, the
owner of the salvage ship and the crew know that the crew
will obtain master-awarded compensation, the conventional-
wage component of the crew's compensation will be adjusted
to reflect that fact and the impact of the master-made
awards on anything of interest will be substantially
diminished. Second, for the same reasons that the following
conclusion applied to court-made awards to crew members,
the interdependence of salvage-award payments to crew
members and the conventional wages they receive will not
totally eliminate the positive economic effects or allocative-
efficiency effects of the master-made awards. Third, if ship
masters seek to individuate salvage awards in the way that
would promote the ship owner's interest (because they feel
obligated to do so and/or because they realize that it is in
their long-run career interests to do so), they will
individuate the relevant awards in the way that is most
allocatively efficient if (1) the law eliminates any distortion
in the profits the salvage-ship owner makes or (2) any
distortion in the profits of the marine-salvage business that
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the law does not eliminate does not critically affect the
profitability of the most profitable individuation scheme
(relative to some less profitable alternative). Although the
first of these two conditions is unlikely to be fulfilled, I see
no reason to believe that the second is not fulfilled. Fourth,
the probability that the master will divide crew salvage-
awards in the way that is in his employer's as opposed to
his own short-run interest will be highest if he is the master
of a salvage ship, next highest if he is the master of a
tugboat that is somewhat adapted to perform salvage
operations, and lowest if he is the captain of a non-salvage
passenger ship or freighter. This contestable conclusion
rests on the assumption that, although employers always
want to hire executives who make choices that are in the
employer's interest, they will be less likely to investigate
and be less likely to be disturbed by one-off choices or
resolutions of issues that do not often arise than recurrent
choices that play a significant role in the profit-performance
of their business.
The fifth and final set of comments I want to make
about admiralty law's award-division practices relate to
their impact on salvage-investment decisions and salvage-
investment misallocation. Four comments are in order.
First, once more, the net effect of any such divisions the
courts make on the profitability of salvage operations and
hence salvage-operation investments will be substantially
reduced by their impact on the conventional wages that ship
officers and ordinary seamen are paid. Second, such award -
divisions can increase or decrease the profits that a salvage
-operation investment will generate by changing risk costs
and altering individual-rescue-attempt quality and
profitability. Third, to the extent that such divisions
increase or decrease individual-rescue- attempt profitability,
they will tend to increase or decrease salvage-operation
investment. Fourth, although this point would have to be
qualified in a large number of ways that should by now be
obvious, any such award-division's impact on the quantity of
marine-salvage-operation investment is not likely to affect
the misallocation that such investment-decisions generate
because the change in investment profitability is caused by
effects that simultaneously change the allocative efficiency
of marine-salvage investments in the same direction and
presumptively to the same or a similar extent.
The final non-C-award component of marine-salvage
law on which I wish to comment is its rule for dividing any
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marine-peril-related loss among the owners of the property
and lives that were imperiled. The applicable current
doctrine requires the owners of imperiled property to make
ex post payments to each other in a manner that would
equalize the proportion of the value of the property that was
imperiled that each ends up losing-that is, that equalize
among owners of imperiled property the ratio of (the sum of
the private value of the property each lost and the positive
or negative payments he made) to (the private value to him
of the property that was originally imperiled). I want to
make four comments about this doctrine. First, it should be
emphasized that the doctrine in question (the so-called
''general-average principle") does not require payments to be
made to or by potential victims whose lives were at risk but
who owned no imperiled property and excludes from
consideration the value of lives originally imperiled and
lives lost when calculating the cross-payments that owners
of imperiled property have to make to each other. Second, to
the extent that (1) decisions about the focus of rescue
attempts (whether they are directed at saving lives or
saving property) are controlled by the ship owner or by
someone who is guided by the ship owner's interest, (2) the
ship owner will not have to bear the cost of lives lost (is not
formally liable for such losses or is insured or judgment-
proof against having to pay damages for such losses), and
(3) the salvor's monetary incentives (the C-award formula)
and personal non-monetary preferences will not induce him
to take all allocatively efficient steps to rescue any
imperiled lives, this exclusion of the private value of the
lives that were imperiled and the private value of the lives
that were lost from the victim-cross-payment calculation
will misallocate resources by causing too few resources to be
allocated to saving lives and too many to saving property for
any given rescue-attempt expenditure. Third, the
implementation of the general-average principle would
prevent the misallocation that the owner of the imperiled
ship might otherwise find profitable by accepting offers of
rescue-attempt variants whose attractiveness to him
critically depended on his placing a higher value on saving a
dollar of his own property or other property for whose loss
he would personally have to pay than on saving a dollar's
worth of someone else's property for whose loss he would
not have to pay if the following conditions were fulfilled:
namely, if (1) the general-average principle were applied
accurately, either (2)(A) the private value of all pieces of
relevant imperiled property and the private cost of salving
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all categories of imperiled property were either undistorted
or distorted in the same direction by the same percentage or
(B) the private value of different categories of imperiled
property were distorted in different directions and/or by
different percentages, the private cost of rescuing different
categories of imperiled property were distorted in different
directions and/or by different percentages, but either the
sign and magnitude of the distortion in the private value of
each category of imperiled property equaled the sign and
magnitude of the distortion in the private cost of rescuing
that category of imperiled property or the following ratio
were the same for each category of imperiled property-the
ratio of (the distortion in the private value of the property in
question minus the distortion in the private cost of rescuing
the property in question) to (the private cost of rescuing the
property in question), and (3) both the ship owner's
decision-maker and the salvor made no relevant mistakes.
Fourth, although the conditions listed in the
immediately preceding sentence may not be fulfilled, with
one important exception that will be explored immediately
below, it would almost certainly be third-best allocatively
efficient to proceed on the assumption that the conditions in
question were fulfilled. I should add that the exception in
question does not undermine the conclusion that if the
general-average principle were altered to take the value of
imperiled and lost lives into account in an accurate way, its
implementation would prevent the misallocation that would
otherwise result from ship owners' favoring rescue attempts
that, from the perspective of allocative efficiency, were
"biased" toward saving the ship owner's property and
property whose owners the ship owner would personally
have to compensate for any related loss they sustained.
Fifth, there is some reason to believe that the actual
implementation of the general-average principle causes
exactly the opposite kind of rescue-attempt-type
misallocation to the one with which the preceding two
comments were concerned-namely, causes the ship owner
to accept offers of rescue-attempt variants that are less
allocatively efficient than available variants that would
have been more likely to prevent damage to his own
property. For this outcome to be generated, the following
conditions must be fulfilled: (1) the combination of the
damage to the ship owner's property that a particular
rescue attempt could prevent and the repair that damage
would occasion would increase the value of the ship owner's
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property, (2) either in theory or in practice the admiralty
courts' general-average calculations ignore or undervalue
the ship owner's gain, and (3) in part because the ship
owner will not be charged for that gain, the amount of the
related repair costs the ship owner would bear (because on
their account he would have to make higher transfer-
payments to other victims or would receive lower transfer-
payments from other victims) is lower than the amount by
which the preventable-damage/repair combination would
increase the value of his property. The first two of these
conditions require some elucidation.
Even if one excludes the possibility that the ship
owner may succeed in attributing to the perilous event pre-
existing damage with which it had absolutely nothing to do
if he succeeds in deterring a rescue attempt that would have
prevented that type of damage had it not already been
present, the preventable-damage/repair combination can
increase the value of the ship owner's property or his profits
(transfer-payment consequences aside) in two sets of
circumstances: (1).when the damage exacerbates a condition
the ship owner would have had repaired in any event and
the additional damage the peril inflicts does not reduce the
value of his repaired property by as much as the cost he
would otherwise have incurred to repair the pre-existing
damage or (2) when, regardless of whether the preventable
damage would have affected something that was already
damaged or worn out, the repaired property would be
superior to the pre-peril property. The second condition is
that in practice, and perhaps even in theory, the general-
average principle will not charge the ship owner for any
gain the preventable-damage/repair combination in
question would confer on him (salvage-law-required
transfer-payment consequences aside). Although the experts
with whom I have discussed this issue agree that, in
principle, ship owners should be charged with any such
gains they secure, they are not sure whether admiralty-law
judges would take these gains into account if they knew
that they had been generated and are certain that in many
instances the other marine-peril victims will not be able to
prove that the ship owner had secured such gains. In part,
the latter conclusion reflects the objective difficulty of
establishing the pre-existing condition and comparing the
value of the repaired property with that of undamaged,
unrepaired property. But it also reflects an institutional
feature of salvage-law practice: judges rely on ship owner-
selected adjustors for estimates of the value of the property
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that was imperiled, the value of the property that was lost,
the extent of any unrepaired or unrepairable damage that
was done, and the extent to which the value of the property
that was repaired was lower or, presumably, higher than
the value it had prior to being damaged in the incident that
gave rise to the litigation. Although the ship owners' choices
are constrained by requirements that they pick someone
from a list of qualified adjustors, I am sufficiently cynical to
believe that ship owners will be able to select adjustors who
will not tell the court that the repaired property had pre-
existing damage or wear (for example, that the new hull
was thicker than the worn-down hull that was damaged in
the incident in question) or will underestimate the repair
costs the ship owner would have had to incur in any event
or the amount by which the value of the repaired property
exceeded the pre-incident value of the property in question.
Sixth, and finally, although I am fairly certain that it is
not third-best allocatively efficient for courts to rely on ship-
owner-selected adjustors in marine-salvage cases, I do
suspect that if the courts in question selected such adjustors
themselves using criteria that reduced the probability that
the adjustors selected would have an incentive to favor the
ship owners and were more cognizant of the possibility that
ship owners might have, from the perspective of allocative
efficiency, a bias against rescue attempts that might
prevent certain types of damage to their property, a version
of the general-average principle that applied to potential
victims whose lives had been endangered but who had no
imperiled property and took account of the value of lives
imperiled and lost when calculating the transfer-payments
that all potential victims had to make or were entitled to
receive would be third-best allocatively efficient.
I will now analyze the second-best and third-best
allocative efficiency of the courts' approach to how much a
marine rescuee should be required to pay a successful
rescuer who has not been able to negotiate a binding price
for his services." In carrying out these analyses, I will
62. To ease the exposition, I will assume that either (1) the awards actually
made are divided in an allocatively efficient manner among the payees and
payors-that is, among rescue-ship owners, individual officers, and individual
ordinary seamen on the payee side and among owners of imperiled ships,
owners of imperiled cargo, and owners of imperiled lives on the payor side--or
(2) that any allocative inefficiency generated by the divisions in question will
not affect the approach to calculating the total award or the magnitude of the
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ignore the very real possibility that, despite the courts' and
many legal scholars' claims to the contrary, not only are
court-ordered marine-salvage awards not controlled by any
formula or protocol, they are not even guided in any
coherent way by the factors the courts claim determine their
award-decisions. In other words, this section assumes that
Gilmore and Black are wrong when they conclude that trial
judges set marine-salvage awards by "pull[ing] an arbitrary
figure out of the air."63 More specifically, the analysis'
assumptions about the content of the positive law of marine
salvage are based on the 1958 treatise Kennedy's Civil
Salvage.' I have made this choice for three reasons: (1)
because experts I have consulted think that this treatise
was accurate at the time it was written, most importantly
(2) because Landes and Posner relied on this treatise6" and I
want to criticize the argument they made for the allocative
efficiency of the positive law as they saw it, and (3) because
many experts have told me that with some exceptions that
are easy to take account of-for example, the fact that,
today, salvors are far more likely to be liable for the
environmental damage they cause than they were in
1958 66-the Kennedy-treatise continues to reflect reality.
According to Kennedy's 1958 treatise, courts determine
the compensation award in marine-salvage cases by
considering the following factors:
A. As regards the salved property:
(1) The degree of danger, if any, to human life.
(2) The degree of danger to the property.
(3) The value of the property salved.
B. As regards the salvors:
(1) The degree of danger, if any, to human life.
total award in individual cases that is allocatively efficient. Both these
assumptions are unrealistic.
63. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 39, at 563.
64. KENNEDY, supra note 41.
65. Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 101-02.
66. See Brough, supra note 10, at 100-04.
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(2) The salvors' (a) classification [that is, in my terms-
professional, semi-professional, casual], (b) skill and (c) conduct.
(3) The degree of danger, if any, to property employed in the
salvage service and its value.
(4) The (a) time occupied and (b) work done in the performance of
the salvage service.
(5) Responsibilities incurred in the performance of the salvage
service such, e.g., as . . . liability to passengers or freighters
through deviation and delay.
(6) Loss or expense incurred in the performance of the salvage
service, such, e.g., as.. ., loss of profitable trade, repair of damage
caused to ship, boats, or gear, fuel consumed, etc.67
This basic account needs to be supplemented in at least
eight ways. First, at least in the United States, awards are
not given to so-called "pure life" salvors-that is, to salvors
who have rescued lives but no property. Second, the value
attributed to lives saved and injuries sustained is far lower
than their allocative value. Third, although item B(2)(c)-
salvor conduct-does cover individual-salvor decisions to
execute a rescue-attempt variant that unjustifiably
(allocatively inefficiently?) interferes more with the success
of other rescue attempts than an alternative rescue-attempt
variant he could have executed, item B(2)(c) appears not to
cover the possibility that, from the perspective of allocative
efficiency, too many rescue attempts were made in the case
in question-though, as the next comment indicates, the
courts may take account of this possibility when adjusting
the award they make in response to their calculation of
items A(1) and A(2) in the above list. Fourth, there is some
reason to believe that courts define factors A(1) and A(2) in
the above list-the degree of danger to life and property-to
take into consideration not only the probability that the
salvage in question would be "saved" by Mother Nature or
by the "self-rescue" efforts of the imperiled ship if no one
else made a rescue attempt but also the probability that the
salvage would have been rescued by another salvor had the
successful salvor in question not made a rescue attempt.
Although, as we shall see, such a practice would have
problematic effects on marine-salvage-operation-investment
67. See KENNEDY, supra note 41, at 174.
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decisions, it would make the award a successful salvor
receives depend on whether the full set of rescue attempts
to which his effort belonged was allocatively efficient. Fifth,
although item B(2)(a)-the type of salvor involved in a
particular case-does suggest that the courts take account
of differences in the amount of fixed costs of salving that
different types of salvors have incurred, and other items in
the list-all items in set B except item B(2)(a)-suggest that
the courts take account of the variable cost of successful
rescue attempts, nothing in the list suggests that the courts
take account of the other facts that will influence the ratio
of the successful salvor's salvage-operation investment to
his total variable cost of salving or the percentage by which
the awards he receives when his rescue attempts are
successful must exceed the variable cost he incurred to
execute his successful rescue attempts for him to cover his
salvage-operation fixed costs-namely, (if the calculation is
made on a ship-by-ship basis) the number of rescue
attempts he will use the ship in question to make and the
percentage of those rescue attempts that will be successful.
Sixth, nothing in the list suggests that the courts consider
whether the current level of salvage-operation investment is
allocatively efficient.68 Seventh, the list of salvor attributes
the courts consider does not contain the value of any cargo
the salvor ship was carrying and the probability that it
would be lost or damaged to any given extent, which are
factors that will influence the allocative variable cost of the
rescue attempt and its private variable cost (to the extent
that the salvor owns the cargo, will personally have to
compensate its owner for any cargo that is lost or damaged,
or will have to pay higher insurance premiums or incur
other "costs" if he goes bankrupt because of his inability to
compensate owners of lost or damaged cargo to whom he
was liable).69 Eighth, as another leading treatise on marine
salvage recognized, in practice, the factors under heading A
are by far the most important determinants of the awards
that are made, and "the time and labor expended by the
salvors in rendering the salvage service"-factor B(4)-and
68. This omission parallels the court's failure to assess for negligence a
business' decision to stay in business at all or to produce the amount of output it
chose to produce-that is, to review for negligence an injurer's activity-level
choices.
69. The author of the Harvard Note pointed out this deficiency. Harvard
Note, supra note 19, at 1915.
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"the value of the property employed . . . in rendering the
service and the danger to which such property was
exposed"-factor B(3)-are the least important.70
I will now analyze the second-best and third-best
allocative efficiency of the approach the courts have taken to
determining the protocol they should use to calculate the
total award to make to individual successful marine salvors
and the protocol they are reported to have followed when
making such decisions in individual cases. My initial
comments will assume that the courts could execute or
commission all relevant theoretical and empirical analyses
perfectly and costlessly. I will then consider the possibility
that, although the above approach and protocol would
clearly be allocatively inefficient if the above second-best-
allocative-efficiency-analysis assumptions were accurate,
they might be third-best allocatively efficient, given the
inevitable cost and probable inaccuracy of the theoretical
and empirical work the court could do or contract out.
On the second-best-allocative-efficiency-analysis
assumption that the courts could execute all relevant
theoretical and empirical analyses perfectly and costlessly,
there are at least twelve categories of reasons to doubt that
the approach the courts have used to calculate marine-
salvage awards is second-best allocatively efficient. The first
two relate to more general features of the courts' treatment
of this issue. The last ten relate to specific features of the
protocol that the 1958 treatise Kennedy's Civil Salvage
claims the courts follow.
First, to my knowledge, no court has ever said that its
total-salvage-award decision7' was designed to minimize
allocative inefficiency.72  Admittedly, such courts have
sometimes explained their decisions in terms of
70. NORRIS, supra note 39, §§ 244-73.
71. Or its decisions about the way in which award-payments should be
divided among payors on the one hand and payees on the other.
72. I take no position in this Article on whether the judicial resolution of
various award-issues that would be most allocatively efficient would be the
resolution required by our relevant moral-rights commitments, would be legally
correct, or would be most desirable, rights-considerations aside. For accounts of
these issues and a discussion of the relationship between the allocative
efficiency of a choice and its justness, legality, and desirability (rights and legal
considerations aside), see MARKOVITS, supra note 13, at 377-401; Markovits,
supra note 3; Markovits, supra note 38.
2011] 127
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
consequences whose effectuation might be associated with
increases in allocative efficiency. However, the correlation
in question is far from clear, and the judges seem to value
the consequences to which they refer for reasons other than
their connection to allocative efficiency. Thus, when courts
justify their salvage awards by citing their tendency to
encourage maritime commerce by reducing its hazards, it is
not clear that they have "increasing allocative efficiency by
encouraging maritime commerce" in mind." When courtsjustify their marine-salvage awards on the ground that they
reward Ggood Samaritans, it is not clear that the judges
want to encourage Good Samaritanism if and only if it is
allocatively efficient: to the contrary, they seem to be
motivated by a distributive "preference" for rewarding Good
Samaritans regardless of whether the Good Samaritan
conduct in the instant case was allocatively efficient. 4 In
fact, even when the courts in question make reference to
"goals" whose attainment seems likely to be allocatively
efficient, other things being equal-for example, preventing
unjust enrichment," deterring the theft of unguarded
property,76 and preventing "the waste" that bilateral
monopoly may cause in rescue situations in which time is of
the essence7 -- the judges' interest seem to be in the
distributive desirability of securing these results (for
example, of preventing "exploitation" in bilateral-monopoly
situations) rather than in the allocative efficiency of doing
so. Admittedly, for some purposes, including those of
Landes and Posner, the important question is not why
judges resolve issues allocatively efficiently (if they do) but
whether they resolve cases allocatively efficiently. For these
purposes, the critical issue is whether the marine-salvage-
award protocol the courts used is (third-best) allocatively
efficient. However, the fact that the courts have never
indicated that they were trying to minimize allocative
inefficiency and have made some statements that suggest
that they were not trying to achieve this goal clearly bears
73. See Harvard Note, supra note 19, at 1898 & n.13.
74. See id. at 1898 & n.16.
75. Id. at 1898 & n.14.
76. Id. at 1898 & n.15.
77. Id. at 1898 & n.17.
128 [Vol. 59
CRITIQUE OF LANDES & POSNER
on whether their approach was third-best, much less
second-best, allocatively efficient.
Second, although admiralty courts never discussed the
way in which they chose the protocol to follow when
calculating marine-salvage awards, nothing suggests that
they proceeded in either of the ways that I have argued
would be second-best allocatively efficient to approach this
issue, which include:
(1) listing the various types of allocative costs marine
peril can generate, delineating the various ways in which
marine-salvage awards can affect each of these types of
allocative costs, determining the magnitude of each such
type of cost that would result if any given marine-salvage-
award protocol were followed, and identifying the protocol
whose use would minimize the sum of such costs or
(2) listing the various types of marine-peril-related
avoidance-decision misallocation, allocative transaction
costs, marine-peril-related-policy public-financing (non-
transaction-cost) misallocation, and allocative risk costs
that can be generated, delineating the various ways in
which marine-salvage awards can affect the amount of each
such type of misallocation or allocative cost that is
generated, determining the magnitude of each such type of
misallocation or allocative cost that would be generated if
any given such protocol were followed, and identifying the
protocol that would minimize the sum of such misallocation
and allocative costs.
Thus, no court has ever tried to determine the award
formula that would eliminate each particular type of
marine-loss-avoidance-decision misallocation that might be
generated, noticed that the formula that would eliminate
one such type of misallocation would not eliminate the other
types of marine-loss-avoidance-decision misallocation that
could be generated, tried to determine the factors that
would influence the amount of marine-loss-avoidance-
decision misallocation of each relevant type that would be
generated if the awards deviated in either direction by
various amounts from the awards that would eliminate that
type of misallocation, attempted to determine the amount of
misallocation of each relevant type that would be generated
if a given set of awards were made (if a given award-
calculation protocol were followed), or attempted to identify
the set of awards (the award-calculation protocol) that
would minimize the sum of the marine-loss-avoidance-
decision misallocation that was generated (or the sum of
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such misallocation, marine-peril-related allocative
transaction costs, marine-peril-related risk costs, and
marine-peril-related public-finance-generated
misallocation).
Third, no court has ever articulated the formula by
which it calculates the award it makes in individual cases.
Even if the courts had supplied the list of factors that the
1958 treatise Kennedy's Civil Salvage and other scholarly
works claim influence judicial decisions and even if in
addition that list covered all the factors courts take into
account when calculating marine-salvage awards, such a
list would not constitute a formula-that is, would not allow
potential marine salvors and potential marine rescuees to
predict accurately the awards that will be made. I can
imagine conditions under which it would be second-best
allocatively efficient for courts to provide less rather than
more guidance to these parties about the court's future
decisions-for example, when the awards that are second-
best allocatively efficient are higher than the awards that
would minimize the misallocation that potential rescuees
generate but lower than the awards that would minimize
the misallocation that potential rescuers generate and
potential rescuees will underestimate the awards that the
court will make and potential rescuers will overestimate
those awards. However, I suspect that the conditions for
this result will rarely obtain. In general, even if
(counterfactually) the courts were basing their marine-
salvage awards on a formula that was second-best
allocatively efficient, their failure to delineate the formula
they were using would be allocatively inefficient.
Fourth, although the list of factors that allegedly
influence the marine-salvage awards courts make contains
many items that do relate to considerations that affect the
award that would minimize particular types of marine-
peril-related misallocation (for example, the amount of
misallocation generated by marine-salvage-operation-
investment decisions), they do so only crudely. For example,
although the salvor's classification (professional, semi-
professional, casual) does relate to the fixed costs of salvage-
operation investment that the salvor's salving operating
profits must cover, it is a far-from-accurate surrogate for
such fixed-cost data.
Fifth, even when the list of factors contains some
components of a figure that is relevant to the calculation of
the second-best-allocatively-efficient award, it omits other
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components of the figure in question. Thus, although the list
contains most components of the private variable cost of
rescue attempts, it omits the weighted-average-expected
amount of variable costs a rescue attempt will impose on
the attempter by increasing the probability that cargo he is
carrying will be lost or damaged. Similarly, although the list
contains many components of the private and allocative
benefits that a rescue attempt should be expected to
generate ex ante, it omits the weighted-average-expected
value of the lives that may be saved in pure-life-salvage
situations.
Sixth, even when the list includes a relevant factor, the
courts may mis-measure the factor in question. Thus, the
general view is that courts undervalue lives saved and at
risk and injuries prevented or sustained.
Seventh, the list omits a number of determinants of the
positive economic consequences of the awards made that an
allocatively efficient protocol would take into account. For
example, the list does not include the allocative efficiency of
the current level of salvor investment or the number of
rescue attempts the successful salvor will make with the
salvage ship in question and the percentage of those
attempts that will be successful (which one would have to
know in addition to his fixed costs and the private variable
cost of the successful rescue attempt to determine the
percentage by which the average award he receives when
successful must exceed the average private variable cost of
his successful rescue attempts for him to earn a normal rate
of return on his current salvage-operation investments).
Eighth, the list does not reference many determinants
of the allocative efficiency of the positive economic
consequences of the use of a particular award-protocol. For
example, it ignores the allocative efficiency of the current
level of salvor investments (which will depend on the
allocative cost of successive salvor investments and their
impact on the allocative-efficiency gains that actual rescue
attempts generate, once the relevant investments are made,
the allocative efficiency of the avoidance-move rejections
they induce potential rescuees to make, and the allocative
efficiency of the rescue-attempt offers they induce potential
rescuees to reject [by raising the salvage-awards courts will
make]).
Ninth, as I have already indicated, the list seems not to
reflect the possibility that the awards made may cause
misallocation by inducing an allocatively inefficient number
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of rescue attempts or inducing potential rescuees to reject
offers to execute allocatively efficient rescue attempts.
Tenth, the list clearly does not cover the allocative
efficiency of the pre-incident (background) avoidance-
decisions of the rescuee.
Eleventh, although the list does cover the externalities
a rescue attempt would otherwise generate by interfering
unnecessarily with other rescue attempts made on the same
body of salvage and various international conventions and
privately developed governance structures have internalized
to salvors much of the environmental consequences of their
actions that admiralty law failed to internalize,78 the list
clearly does not make reference to most of the various
Pareto imperfections that will individually and collectively
distort the private value of the property and lives saved, the
private fixed salvage-operation costs of the salvor, the
private variable cost of rescue attempts, and the private
cost of most types of potential-rescuee avoidance-moves.
Twelfth, although I assume that the judges have
indicated the direction in which their awards will be
affected by variations in the parameters the list contains,
the judges have not indicated the amounts by which the
awards they announce will be affected by given variations
in each such parameter, and (even if there is reason to
believe that the courts have varied their awards in the right
direction with changes in the parameters in question) there
is no reason to believe that they have varied their awards to
the right extent in response to changes in these parameters.
Of course, the preceding demonstration that the courts'
reported approach to setting marine-salvage awards is not
second-best allocatively efficient does not establish its third-
best allocative inefficiency-that is, the courts' reported
approach might be allocatively efficient, given the inevitable
cost and probable inaccuracy of the various theoretical and
empirical analyses that would be components of the second-
best-allocatively-efficient approach. Indeed, I have already
admitted that both in the short run and possibly in the
longer run it would probably be third-best allocatively
efficient for courts to ignore some factors that a second-best-
allocatively-efficient analysis would take into account.
However, I see absolutely no reason to believe that all the
78. See Brough, supra note 10, at 111.
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features of the courts' approach that I have just pointed out
would be deficiencies from the perspective of second-best-
allocative-efficiency analysis would be strengths from the
perspective of third-best-allocative-efficiency analysis.
There is no reason to believe that muddling through is the
third-best-allocatively-efficient approach to picking a
salvage award, that the various features of the courts' list
that are deficiencies from a second-best perspective are
individually unimportant or substantially cancel each other
out, or (most generally) that the cost of making the list used
conform more closely to its second-best-allocatively-efficient
counterpart would be prohibitive from the perspective of
allocative efficiency.
I began this Article by explaining why-even if the
courts made third-best-allocatively-efficient marine-salvage
awards-their efforts would not be as allocatively efficient
as the most-allocatively-efficient set of marine-peril-related
policies the State could adopt. This section has shown that
the courts' performance in this area is almost certainly far
more misallocative than it had to be.
VII. A CRITIQUE BOTH OF LANDES AND POSNER'S
CONCLUSION THAT THE "JUDGE-MADE" LAW OF MARINE
SALVAGE DISPLAYS "IMPRESSIVE CONGRUENCE WITH" THEIR
GENERAL "ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF JUDGE-MADE LAW"
HYPOTHESIS AND OF THE TYPE OF ARGUMENT THEY MADE TO
SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION
As I indicated in the Introduction, in a classic article,
William Landes and Richard Posner argue that what they
refer to as "judge-made" marine-salvage law "is consistent
with" and displays "impressive congruence with" their
hypothesis that "the rules of the judge-made law are best
explained as efforts-however unwitting-to bring about
[economically-] efficient results."9 Even if one ignores the
differences between the claim that economic efficiency can
predict the content of "judge-made" law and the claim that
economic efficiency can explain "judge-made" law,"° it seems
79. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4 at 102, 128.
80. The latter claim implies (1) that the economically efficient resolution of
that issue is the correct resolution of that issue as a matter of law or (2) that, for
some personal reason, judges are motivated to reach economically efficient
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to me that Section Six refutes Landes and Posner's
conclusion, regardless of how generously (that is, weakly)
one interprets the critical expressions "is consistent with"
and displays "impressive congruence with."
However, as important as it is to refute the general
economic efficiency of "judge-made" law position to which
Landes and Posner and many other Law & Economics
scholars subscribe, it is equally important to criticize the
kind of argument that Landes and Posner and others use to
support this position. The argument that Landes and
Posner use to justify their conclusion that "judge-made"
marine-salvage law is allocatively efficient has much in
common with the kind of storytelling through which they
and other scholars who believe in the allocative efficiency of
"judge-made" law in general try to establish the allocative
efficiency of legal doctrines and their application in general.
I will close this section and article by describing and
criticizing the type of argument that Landes and Posner
make in their marine-salvage piece and explaining its
relationship to the general class of arguments that they and
conclusions or that, for some institutional reason, judges are led to reach
economically efficient conclusions. Although I agree that the internal-to-law
correct resolution of some legal issues is the most-economically efficient
resolution of those issues courts could devise, I do not think that this is true for
all, or even most, legal issues. In part, this conclusion reflects my belief that the
economically efficient resolution of many moral-rights-related legal-rights issues
is not the just resolution of those issues and, in part, my belief that much
statutory law that is not designed to effectuate moral rights is also not
allocatively efficient. See MARKOVITS, supra note 13; Markovits, supra note 3;
Markovits, supra note 38. In addition, I do not think that judges believe either
(1) that the economically efficient resolution of all legal rights issues is the just
or internal-to-law correct resolution of those issues or (2) that they will best be
able to further their judicial or non-judicial careers by making economically
efficient decisions. Landes and Posner's inclusion of the expression "however
unwitting" suggests that they do not disagree with this last point. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 4, at 128. Finally, although I agree that there may be some
tendency for litigants who would benefit from the economically efficient
resolution of legal-rights issues to spend more money arguing for such an
outcome than litigants who would benefit from the economically inefficient
resolution of that issue would spend arguing for their preferred resolution of the
issue in question (since the former litigants have more equivalent-dollars to
gain than the latter have to lose from the adoption of an economically efficient
decision-standard), I doubt that any such difference is a sufficiently important
determinant of the content of judge-made law for that content to be explicable in
this way.
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others use to establish the allocative efficiency of other
"judge-made" doctrines and their application.
Basically, Landes and Posner proceed by (1) listing the
factors that the courts have taken into consideration when
making marine-salvage awards, (2) explaining that those
factors do affect the award that would be allocatively
efficient in a given case or would play a role in the most-
allocatively-efficient formula that courts could use to
calculate marine-salvage awards because they affect the
impact that the award(s) would have on the allocative
efficiency of the particular types of private decisions they
would affect, (3) arguing that the courts vary the awards
they make in the allocatively efficient direction in response
to variations in the magnitude of the factors they consider,
and (4) offering arguments for the allocative efficiency of
courts' ignoring certain factors that would otherwise have
been allocatively efficient for them to take into account.8'
The implausibility of many of these latter arguments
aside, this type of argument has the following deficiencies:
(1) its analysis of the allocative-efficiency-relevance of
the factors the courts consider is undercut by its failure to
take account of the full range of choices whose substance
and allocative efficiency the factors in question and marine-
salvage awards affect;
(2) its analysis of the impact of the factors the courts
consider on the substance and allocative efficiency of the
choices it recognizes those factors affect is undercut by its
failure to recognize the interdependence of many of the
choices in question;
(3) its analysis of the impact of marine-salvage awards
on the allocative efficiency of the choices it recognizes those
awards will affect (and hence its analysis of the allocative
efficiency of particular marine-salvage awards or of
particular formulas for calculating such awards) is
undermined by its failure to take account of the fact that
81. Thus, Landes and Posner argue that the American courts' practice of
counting the value of lives saved when property as well as lives have been
rescued but not providing compensation for "pure life" salvors may be
allocatively efficient because-although allocative efficiency will be furthered by
giving potential rescuers appropriate incentives to save lives as well as property
when both are imperiled-altruism may secure allocative efficiency when only
lives are in danger. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 104-05, 105 n.48.
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the courts have ignored many of the determinants of the
award that would be most allocatively efficient for them to
make-inter alia, the full range of Pareto imperfections that
individually and in combination distort the profitability of
the choices the awards affect and/or cause individual
choosers to make choices that are not in their individual
interest;
(4) its analysis of the allocative-efficiency-relevance of
particular factors is undermined by its failure to take
account of the fact that awards that eliminate (or reduce)
the misallocation generated by one or more types of
decisions may increase the misallocation generated by one
or more other types of decisions;
(5) its analysis of the allocative efficiency of judicially-
prescribed salvage awards is limited by its failure to
consider whether the courts have made the awards they
issue vary to the allocatively efficient extent in response to
given changes in the value of the factors they consider (by
focusing exclusively on whether the courts vary the awards
they make in response to changes in the value of relevant
parameters in the allocatively efficient direction); and
(6) for some purposes, the type of conclusion that this
type of argument can generate does not provide the
information that is required-even if the courts made the
awards that were the most-allocatively-efficient awards
they could prescribe, such awards, standing alone, would
not constitute the most-allocatively-efficient response the
State could make to the possibility of marine peril.
I should add that Landes and Posner (and others who
make the kind of argument they make in the article this
piece criticizes) never acknowledge the possibility, much
less the reality, that the most-allocatively-efficient response
that courts can make to some problem does not by itself
constitute the most-allocatively-efficient response the State
can make to that problem.
Admittedly, some of the deficiencies of the argument I
just criticized will not appear when the judicial decisions
under scrutiny are binary rather than continuous-for
example, when the issue is (1) whether a particular
defendant is strictly liable or liable only for the
consequences of his negligence or (2) was a particular
defendant's conduct negligent as opposed to (3) how large an
award (how much damages) should a particular defendant
have to pay? However, other deficiencies of the Landes-
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Posner marine-salvage-award argument are equally salient
when the judicial decisions whose supposed allocative
efficiency is being established are binary. For example, in a
previous article, I showed that Landes and Posner's
argument for the allocative efficiency of the (alleged)
common-law practice of holding members of an industry
strictly liable during the industry's infancy but liable only if
found negligent when the industry has matured was flawed,
inter alia, by its failure to consider the full range of
allocatively inefficient decisions that businesses could make
that would not in practice be assessed for negligence and
the large number of Pareto imperfections other than
accident-or-pollution-loss externalities not internalized by
legal-liability rules that could distort the profitability of the
choices in question (and whose magnitude would, in
different cases, increase and decrease as the industry in
question matured).,2 Somewhat less complicatedly but
equally tellingly, Bob Rabin pointed out that Posner's
conclusion that a trolley company had not behaved
negligently in a case in which a plaintiff was electrocuted
when a long wire he was carrying came into contact with
uninsulated overhead trolley wires beneath an overpass was
critically affected by Posner's failure to consider the possible
negligence of the railroad's failure to post warnings on both
sides of all such overpasses-that is, the failure to consider
the possibility that even if the trolley company's decision to
place their necessarily-uninsulated wires overhead rather
than in the ground was not negligent, their failure to post
warnings may have been negligent. 3
In my judgment, the common law is not in general
allocatively efficient and should not in general be
82. Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting from a
"Negligence" System to a "Strict-Liability" Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-
Imperfect Economy: A Partial and Preliminary Third-Best-Allocative-Efficiency
Analysis, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11, 123-32 (1998).
83. Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 955 (1981). Posner's argument was that-
given the low probability of this kind of loss and the high cost of placing
underground the wire that caused it (which had to be uninsulated to supply
electricity to the trolley)-the trolley company's decision to use overhead wires
was not negligent because the cost of placing the wires underground was higher
than the reduction in weighted-average-expected accident losses placing them
there would generate. See William A. Landes & Richard M. Posner, The Positive
Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 893-94 (1981).
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allocatively efficient. Law & Economics scholars, who at
least supposedly are experts in executing allocative-
efficiency analyses,"4 think otherwise in part, because like
almost everyone (including me), they would like their
expertise to have more value rather than less (for example,
to put them in a position to determine the internally-correct
answer to legal-rights questions). Despite their inability to
explain why judges should make choices that are
allocatively efficient,85 many Law & Economics scholars
continue to insist on the allocative efficiency of what they
term "judge-made law" and to back up this conclusion with
bad arguments that have many or all of the deficiencies of
the argument that Landes and Posner make for the
allocative efficiency of marine-salvage-award law. I chose to
close this article with this more general critique (1) because
the efforts of these Law & Economics scholars have an
impact on the perceptions of other legal scholars and on
legal pedagogy and (2) because the problematic character of
this work has implications both for the role that economists
should play in the policy-making process and for decisions
that university administrations should make on
interdisciplinary appointments and programs involving
economics.
CONCLUSION
This Article (1) delineates the different kinds of
allocative costs that marine-peril contingencies can
generate and the different kinds of marine-peril-related
decisions that can generate allocative inefficiency (marine-
salvage-operation investment decisions, decisions about
84. The word "supposedly" reflects my belief that the economic-efficiency
analyses that most Law & Economics scholars execute are vitiated (1) by their
failure to consider the impact that the policies they are analyzing have on many
of the types of resource misallocation those policies will affect and (2) by their
failure to respond appropriately to The General Theory of Second Best. For a
general critique of Law & Economics scholarship, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS,
TRUTH OR ECONOMICS: ON THE DEFINITION, PREDICTION, AND RELEVANCE OF
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (2008).
85. Note the "however unwitting" language in Landes & Posner. See Landes
& Posner, supra note 4 at 128. For a critique of the various arguments
economists make to explain why judges should be expected to make allocatively
efficient decisions, see Richard S. Markovits, Legal Analysis and the Economic
Analysis of Allocative Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 848-72 (1980).
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whether to offer to attempt or to actually attempt marine
rescues, decisions about the character of the marine-rescue
attempts that are made, decisions by potential rescuees to
accept or reject offers of marine-rescue attempts, and
decisions by potential rescuees to make or reject various
marine-peril-avoidance moves);
(2) defines the formal meaning of "the most-
allocatively-efficient response a State can make to marine-
peril contingencies";
(3) explains why, standing alone, judge-prescribed
marine-rescuee-to-rescuer-compensation awards cannot
minimize the allocative costs that marine peril generates
(the misallocation and allocative transaction and risk costs
that marine-peril-related decisions generate);
(4) discusses the interdependence of the various types
of marine-peril-related decisions that can be made;
(5) defines the second-best-allocatively-efficient and the
third-best-allocatively-efficient approach to deciding
particular issues and the second-best-allocatively-efficient
and third-best-allocatively-efficient resolution of a
particular issue;
(6) executes a partial and preliminary second-best
analysis of the factors that determine the impact of any
marine-salvage-award formula both on each of the types of
marine-peril-related misallocation such awards can affect
and on the total amount of marine-peril-related
misallocation that the use of any given marine-salvage-
award formula will generate;
(7) speculates on the differences between the marine-
salvor-compensation formula that is second-best allocatively
efficient and the formula that is third-best allocatively
efficient;
(8) provides an account of the protocol the courts
allegedly use to determine the compensation they order
defendant marine rescuees to pay plaintiff marine rescuers
who have not been able to negotiate a binding price for their
services;
(9) analyzes the second-best and third-best allocative
efficiency of that protocol-that is, delineates the respects in
which that protocol is definitely not second-best allocatively
efficient and explains why it is extraordinarily unlikely to
be third-best allocatively efficient;
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(10) points out that the preceding analysis refutes
Landes and Posner's claim that the law of marine salvage
"is consistent with" and displays "impressive congruence
with" their hypothesis that "the rules of the judge-made law
are best explained as efforts-however unwitting-to bring
about [economically-]efficient results";86
(11) delineates the structural deficiencies of the type of
argument with which Landes and Posner attempt to
establish their conclusion that marine-salvage law is
allocatively efficient;
(12) asserts that Law & Economics scholars who
believe that "judge-made" law in general is allocatively
efficient often attempt to justify this conclusion with the
same type of argument that Landes and Posner made about
marine-salvage law; and
(13) explains why it is important not only to refute the
conclusion that "judge-made law" is allocatively efficient but
to demonstrate the inadequacy of the type of argument with
which scholars who believe that "judge-made law" is
allocatively efficient attempt to bolster this position.
86. Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 102, 128.
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